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Contents

Editorial Notes 89
Leading Editorials
The Mission and Its Results 92
The Tasks of America 94
Tariff Plans of Congress 95
American Soldiers for France 97
The Employers' I. W. W. 98
General Articles
Munitions ..... William Hard 100
The Tonnage Situation ..... Alvin Johnson 102
Sentimental Furniture ..... J. W. L. 104
English Labor and the War ..... Robert W. Bruère 106
At the Capitol ..... C. M. 108
A Communication 109
Correspondence 111
Books and Things ..... P. L. 112
Reviews of Books
The Cost of Peace ..... F. H. 113
Treitschke's History ..... H. J. L. 115
Recent Publications 116

PRESIDENT WILSON'S letter to Representative Heflin has served a useful purpose in reaffirming unmistakably his adherence to the conception of the outcome of the war and the terms of settlement, which were so explicitly and eloquently stated in his address to the Senate on January 22nd last. When the history of the war comes to be written, this document will take its place not merely as the most adequate statement of democratic popular aspirations and principles in relation to the settlement, but as a singularly powerful diplomatic weapon which served in all the belligerent countries to strengthen democracy and to undermine junkerism. At the present moment, for instance, it is exercising an unquestionable influence upon the program of the Russian democracy and has helped them in their fight against the Russian imperialists. It embodies the hopes and aspirations of the minor peoples of Central Europe who have been suffering so cruelly from the effects of the conflicting ambitions of their more powerful neighbors. All over the world there has been a disposition on the part of the classes who want the settlement to be dominated by the principle of force rather than that of international right to ignore and misinterpret this great document, and there are almost as many members of this class in America as there are in the European countries. It is their attempt to identify the policy of the American Republic with the various European plans to create in Europe, as a result of the settlement, a new Balance of Power rather than the beginnings of an international concert, which at the present time is the great source of moral confusion in this country. The President cannot too frequently direct the attention of American public opinion to it. The Senate Address is the charter of the supernational democracy and if it is used with tact and firmness it will help both to determine the settlement and actually to bring it into existence.

THE new provisional government in Russia may not endure, but it surely has a better chance of endurance than its predecessor. The fact of its domination by social democratic representatives of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers is all-important and may prove to be salutary. The party which constitutes the most active ingredient in Russian political opinion, and whose support had been decisive in securing success for the revolution has coalesced with other parties to form an emergency national government. By so doing it has become largely responsible for the conduct of a government whose policy must necessarily be opportunist, and it has consequently ceased to be a revolutionary party. Without an excessive optimism the friends of Russia may at least hope that a sound beginning has been made in the constitutional development of the Russian democracy. For the time being, at least, the desperate alternative of a dictatorship has been avoided and Russia may yet be spared the convulsions which would inevitably result from the attempt to cure an autocratic Caesarism with a revolutionary Napoleonism.

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IT is also encouraging to learn that the coalition government, as it has now come to be known, is not a mere mechanical combination of the earlier provisional government of the Duma and the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. It had been too briskly assumed that the Duma represented the bourgeois capitalists of the council, the proletariat and the army, whereas the council spoke largely for the workmen of Petrograd and the garrison of the capital, and other national groups were a trifle resentful at its presuming to stand for the people as a whole. Recently what is described as the "properly constituted representatives" of the Cossacks of all the Russias have been making their claims known. They are supposed to represent some five million of landowners who are also soldiers and are in favor of continuing the war as well as suppressing any agrarian disturbances. Peasant deputies to the number of 900 have likewise held a conference in which they passed resolutions calling for a vigorous offensive against the Germans and the restoration of internal order. Last of all arrived a large delegation of sailors and officers of the Black Sea Fleet likewise demanding a continuance of the war. So far the coalition government seems to be able to expand so as to include within itself all these various groups of interests. Kerensky's task will be only partly to reinstate the "iron discipline" into the army in the field of which he spoke with so much eloquence. He will, as well, have to steer a skilful course among these many constantly arising parties, if he is not to arouse more antagonisms than he composes. How favorable is his chance of making this difficult democratic compromise is best revealed by the reported attempt on his life by followers of the old régime. For from the Russian reactionary point of view Kerensky can only be dangerous if he succeeds.

NO less hopeful than the essentially constitutional origin and the national composition of the new government is the nature of the policy to which it is already committed. It is what the French used to call during their revolutionary period a "politique de résistance," but unlike some such policies it is not indiscriminately aggressive. Russia is at war with a powerful and unscrupulous enemy which is in military occupation of large tracts of Russian territory, and which proposes, if possible, to promote its own interests at the expense of the Russian nation. A Russian government, however inadequate it may be in other respects, must at least be able to resist the malevolent designs of its German enemies. It must be able to keep in the field an army which is willing and properly prepared to fight. It must be able to prevent German intrigue from undermining the discipline of the soldiers and the loyalty of the people. It must bend all its energies to restore the vitality of Russia as a center of organized purposive political and military power. Only by so doing can democratic Russia succeed in playing as positive a part in the councils of Europe as was formerly the case with autocratic Russia. Unless democratic Russia is strong, she will in effect be making a separate peace with Germany and betraying her allies, even though no armistice is signed.

DEMOCRATIC Russia must become united and strong, not only to prevent German junkerism from imposing its will upon Europe, but also to make the moderate Russian peace policy count effectively in the counsels of the Allies. By entering into a separate peace Russia would be degraded into a mere accomplice of Germany. By refusing to sign a separate peace, while at the same time doing little to strengthen her administrative and military organization, democratic Russia would exercise only a negative influence upon the ultimate settlement, and would probably suffer at the hands both of her enemies and her friends. But if she can recover her strength and use it for the purpose of insisting on peace without imperialism, Russia might well become the decisive influence in formulating and securing the adoption of a just settlement. The Russian republic would have brilliantly vindicated its advent, not only by recovering even in the midst of a revolution the strength to resist a dangerous and malevolent enemy, but also by helping to bring into existence a Europe which would be favorable to the future unperverted development of a radical social democratic state. The policy of the new Russian government, as recently announced, is at least intended to make Russia strong without permitting her strength to be dangerous to the liberties either of the Russian people or of their neighbors. It deserves the most sympathetic understanding and the most generous support from the American nation.

THE Finnish constitution, recently restored by the Russian provisional government, affords a larger measure of autonomy than is enjoyed by practically any other small nation attached to a great empire. All purely domestic legislation, including even such doubtfully domestic matters as tariff legislation, falls within the province of the Finnish Diet. The Finnish army, officered by Finns, can not be required to serve outside of Finland. One would suppose that the restoration of so liberal a constitution, after the manifold encroachments of the later Romanoff régime, would

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be all that could be required of the Russian provisional government, at this critical juncture. But the Swedish party of Finland, representing the wealth and influence of the country, is demanding complete independence. They hold that since the relation of Finland with Russia was a personal union under the Czar, all legal ties have been dissolved with the abolition of the imperial office. If the matter were one for legal quibbling, it might be urged that all the powers of the Czar have passed over by strictly correct principles of devolution to the provisional government. But the issues involved are too serious for resort to mere legalism. The geographical situation of Finland is such as seriously to menace vital Russian interests, if the country were to fall under anti-Russian influence. Between the Finnish border to Petrograd there are very few miles and no natural barriers. Hostile forces established in Finland could also block the routes from Kola and Archangel, thus isolating Russia even more completely than she has been isolated by the closing of the Baltic and the Dardanelles. Russia therefore can not grant independence to Finland until peace has become so well organized that small nations will no longer be subject to the intrigues of ambitious Powers.

THE failure of any important Irish group to take part in the projected constitutional convention will be a perilous and very likely calamitous act. There never was such an opportunity for Irishmen not merely to get together but actually to unshackle themselves of a generation's bad parliamentarianism. There is no obligation whatever on this gathering of Irishmen to stick to the sterile compromises of the home rule bill. It is a golden opportunity for Irishmen to interpret their needs along new and broad creative lines. Unfortunately for Ireland, the British government saw fit to put to death in 1916 such truly representative Irishmen as Pearse and Connolly, and a national convention without John McNeill, now in prison, is seriously impaired. But the Sinn Fein group is sadly mistaken if it does not recognize in this constitutional convention an unconditional appeal to Irish statesmanship. While the plan calls for an accommodating spirit, the divergence of opinion in Ireland is the best possible argument for an interchange of views, and the fact that delegates are to be chosen from public bodies other than parliamentarian shows the plainest intention that the debate should represent something beside the rancorous stalemate of the past. To a greater extent than ever before Ireland has its fate in its own hands. Only those who want a proprietorship in grievance can finally refuse so fair an opportunity to establish the terms of self-government.

THE excess profits tax in the pending revenue bill is unsatisfactory in every particular. It is computed on an artificial base, the excess of earnings above a supposititiously normal return on actual capital, not upon a base of average antebellum earnings, like the British tax. In consequence it makes no pretence of segregating and collecting for public purposes profits arising out of war conditions. The most serious defect of the tax, however, is its failure to employ the principle of progression. When pig iron is selling at $43 a ton, steel billets at $85, copper at 31 cents a pound, it must be obvious that colossal profits are accumulating that will barely be grazed by an eight per cent or even a sixteen per cent tax. Profits greatly exceeding peace returns are the most appropriate of all sources of war revenue, and to leave them to build mushroom fortunes is sheer fiscal stupidity. It is socially inexpedient as well.

INCOME tax evasion, it is freely asserted, will become much more common if the rates proposed in the war revenue bill receive sanction of law. There will be much old-fashioned tax dodging, and in addition, many fortunes will emigrate to Canada, where there is no income tax, and other fortunes will take refuge in tax exempt bonds. So far as tax dodging is concerned, we know very well that it will occur under any rates sufficiently productive of revenue to be worth considering at a time like the present. It will be the business of our government to devise the most efficient machinery possible for uncovering hidden income, and its incentive will be greater the higher the rates. Migration to Canada of the fortune alone will do no good; the income will still be taxable here if the recipient remains an American citizen or even an American resident. Expatriation of capital together with capitalist would turn the trick, but Canada is deeply in debt, and her taxes may soon be as heavy as our own. Tax exempt bonds are a perfectly safe refuge, so far as they go. But they yield so little that not even the income taxpayer who is subject to the highest rates can afford to exchange six per cent investments for them. Besides, their volume is relatively small, as compared with fortunes that will be heavily taxed.

COLONEL ROOSEVELT'S dearest wish has been denied to him, and comment by those who have opposed him in this case or found themselves in opposition to him recently is almost certain to sound a bit mealy-mouthed. The situation, however, transcends such personal considerations, and we at least have a hope that Colonel Roosevelt will not misunderstand when we say that every man who believes in the justice of our cause will

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wish to see him used to the limit of his rare abilities. He is one of the great forces of American life, admired and even loved by those who are often forced to disagree with him. America will not be fully mobilized until Colonel Roosevelt and all he represents are fully employed.

THE President's appointment of Mr. Hoover as head of the food administration, will win world-wide approval. There need be no hesitation in conferring upon the President the powers which he requests. Exercised through a man like Mr. Hoover the nation has an absolute guaranty that they will be used carefully and with a constant sense that they are for the emergency alone. Everyone who has studied the brilliant administration of the Belgian relief knows that one of the secrets of Mr. Hoover's success is his willingness to take great responsibility combined with his profoundly democratic understanding of the need for decentralization. It goes without saying that no man equals him in experience of international food administration, and Americans may well rejoice that they have secured the services of a man from whom even the enemy has sought advice.

The Mission and Its Results

THE French and British missions have come and gone, and the visit, which only a few days ago constituted such a vivid and pervasive fact, will soon take its place in the vanishing perspective of history. It was, on the whole, an emphatic and a substantial success—one which exceeded the hopes of its projectors and which falsified the gloomy prophecies of its opponents. No incident occurred and no popular impression was created which increased the practical difficulties of making the partnership between the United States and the Franco-British allies practically operative. On the contrary, the bond between the old associates and the newcomer, which, until the arrival of the mission, had been based upon a common enmity rather than upon positive fellowship, obtained a preliminary measure of ratification in popular feeling and goodwill. The visit encouraged a public celebration of a truly fateful experience in military, economic and political coöperation between the United States and the two most liberal nations of western Europe. As a consequence of the visit the experiment has obtained a better chance of success; and since the security of western civilization depends upon the success of the experiment, no one could ask for the joint mission a more complete justification.

The British mission came to this country, as Mr. Balfour has himself intimated, somewhat doubtful of its reception. The British, like the American government, was only too well aware of the possibly unpleasant after effects of the many quarrels between the two countries, of the diplomatic controversies of the present war and of Irish and German-American hostility. The several commissioners, consequently, were apparently instructed to treat American susceptibilities with tender consideration. Keenly alive as they were to the danger of offending the sensitive nationalism of American public opinion, they were careful not to importune, not to read lessons, not to urge haste, not even to make suggestions in public. At the same time they were honestly anxious to hear and to grasp the American point of view and even to adjust themselves to American ways, as when Mr. Balfour swallowed the first cocktail and suffered the first newspaper interview of his life.

The British consistently adopted the policy of exhaustively explaining a given situation, as they understood it, and so of suggesting by implication the action needed to meet it, but of avoiding specific recommendations. They placed their cards face up on the table, but without using the exposure to draw specific inferences as to how in consequence the American government should behave. In relation to the all-important shipping problem, for instance, they disclosed all the figures, the total tonnage, the rate of depletion and of new construction, and an indicated conclusion as to the amount of needed American help. After having posed the problem, the British subsided and exercised no pressure on the Americans to return any particular answer or to adopt any measures of remedial action. The Americans naturally inquired as to British experience under conditions similar to those prevailing in this country and these questions enabled the Englishmen to suggest indirectly lines of action which could be adopted or rejected without embarrassment to either government. By such means the British commissioners combined the maximum of elucidation and exposition with a minimum of interference. In all the negotiations the British mission was fortunate in having at their head a single personality, and one so tactful and friendly as that of Mr. Arthur Balfour. He helped most of all to infuse into the conferences the spirit which made them so fruitful of useful results. He actually did succeed, as so many of his friends in this country hoped he would succeed, in adding something of value to the fund of profitable intercourse between the two countries.

The French government selected a different kind of commission, which was charged with a different spirit and was sent to accomplish a different errand. It was a double-headed body, and the disposition of Americans to hero-worship Marshal

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Joffre often placed his civilian colleague, M. Viviani, in embarrassing and disagreeable situations. Neither of the leaders spoke English and both, consequently, were handicapped in negotiating with American officials and in making themselves understood in public. In urging their claims for help the French were as insistent and outspoken as the British were indirect and discreet. Perhaps the British thought it wise to let all the urgent solicitations come from the French, who could be insistent without the same danger of arousing resentment. At any rate, the French did not hesitate to make a public demand for the early dispatch of American troops to France and so, at the expense of a good deal of irritation, to force the hand of American army officials. The French, also, differed from the English in making no apparent effort to understand in what way and to what extent Americans had a special interest and attitude of their own in relation to the war. They were impatient and suspicious of any resistance to their demands. Possibly the French press representative created this impression rather more than was intended, but certainly the French Commission exhibited little of the tact, open-mindedness and curiosity about the American point of view, so characteristic of the English Commission. However much they clarified the situation in France for American public opinion, they could not have learned much about the real situation in America.

Nevertheless, the French mission served its chief purpose and achieved an incontestable popular triumph. Americans understood that French importunity was born of an equally importunate need, and they were glad to testify with the utmost cordiality to their sympathy for France. They wished that sympathy to obtain the kind of expression which will be most useful to the French, and they showed themselves ready to adjust their own plans as to the manner of using their resources to French advice. Under the circumstances the French mission was justified in asking that in this respect and to this extent their own knowledge of their own needs be allowed to prevail over the plans of the American General Staff. The publicity which they gave to the demand was a refreshing example of sound democratic diplomacy, and should encourage the American government to be equally frank in calling the attention of the French nation to those matters connected with war policy which, from the American point of view, are of most importance.

The incident illustrated perfectly the kind of concessions required of the American government in order to bring into existence effective coöperation with France and Great Britain. Those countries are actually doing the fighting and suffering from a scarcity of resources. Their need must constitute the opportunity and determine to a large extent the kind and measure of American assistance. The government will be forced to place the American people on rations in order to feed those of France and Great Britain. It will have to starve American industries in order to supply those of its European associates with indispensable raw materials. It will have to invest billions of dollars in boats and supplies, which may be prevented by the submarines from reaching their destination, and which when destroyed will constitute as complete an economic loss as if they were high explosive shells. It will have to build the kind of naval vessels which are required to supplement the work of the British fleet and to place them practically under the orders of the British Admiralty. In sending troops to Europe it will have to consult French necessities rather than American scruples and convenience. In all these and other similar respects the American nation must allow its economic and military plans to be largely determined by the pressing needs and the larger experience of its associates. If the French or British government can demonstrate the clear economic and military necessity of any particular measure of assistance, that assistance must be furnished in so far as American judgment consents and American resources permit.

But, while the American nation can be properly asked to subordinate its military and, in a large measure, its economic policy to the necessities of its associates, and while it can agree to such subordination as an inevitable aspect of efficient coöperation during war, it cannot consent to any corresponding subordination of its political program. Its national integrity and independence depends upon the use of military weapons and economic resources on behalf of an ultimate settlement which is the expression of American super-national ideals. If we grant to British and French political purposes an authority similar to that granted to their military plans, the United States will sink into the situation of colonial dependence on its European associates. That would be a fate to which all but a few Anglo- and Franco-Americans would not willingly submit, and the safest way not only to avoid it but to avoid any suspicion of it is to begin immediate discussions with the Italian, French, British and Russian governments about the terms of a mutually acceptable settlement. Ever since the United States entered the war, this subject has been systematically suppressed, but considering the attitude of the new Russian government it cannot be suppressed much longer.

In dealing with this matter the American government would do well to follow the example of

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the French mission and be entirely frank, for without frankness there is likely to grow up a very dangerous misunderstanding. The United States, unlike the other Powers which entered the war, did so without making explicit agreements or asking for any. It has retained in this way its proper independence of political action, but this independence has certain equivocal and ambiguous aspects which will certainly make trouble unless the American government guards against it. Between the political purposes of the Allies, as defined in their answer to President Wilson's note, and Mr. Wilson's own definition of American foreign policy with respect to Europe on January 22nd, there are large discrepancies. The crisis in Russia demands an early attempt to diminish these differences and so far as possible the adoption of a common diplomatic policy as an indispensable condition of conciliating Russian internationalism and of defeating Germany. If an understanding is not reached and published, American public opinion will soon become restive. It does not like to be informed by responsible ministers of the British Crown that a war won, if at all, with American assistance, will be used to realize British imperialist ambitions in Africa. It feels that if the western Powers are depending so largely upon American resources, they should be willing in return to adjust their political purposes to the new conditions created by American belligerency. It hopes for some early testimony from the French and British governments that the American participation in a European war and peace has disarmed their last scruples to an ultimate settlement dominated absolutely by the mechanism and spirit of a Peace League.

The Tasks of America

CERTAIN immediate objectives are clear now. No one who analyzes the strategy of the war doubts that America's first task is to beat the submarine, its second to organize the food supply, its third to effect a financial and industrial mobilization for overwhelming superiority in munitions, its fourth to create a reserve army behind the expeditionary force of General Pershing. These four great programs need, of course, to be executed simultaneously, though they will in all probability affect the result of the war in the order named. But there is a fifth task of equal if not greater immediate military significance which no one suspected two months ago it would be our duty to carry out.

It is a curious conclusion but inescapable that America is called upon to play a major part in the politics of eastern Europe. A combination of circumstances has given President Wilson and the United States a leverage and a prestige of first class strategic importance. The new and bewildered democracy of Russia has a confidence in the America of Woodrow Wilson that it has not in the government of any of the other Allies. In its ultimate purposes the Revolution desires to act with the same non-imperialistic, disinterested, international spirit which the President has proclaimed in all his public utterances. No other man can speak to the Russian Revolution with as much authority and with as much assurance of success. He has made sacrifices for peace as Russians wish to, and he loves liberty as few rulers of great states have ever loved it. He can speak with frankness, and appeal to the Russian democracy out of a common spirit. He can speak also to the Poles, for since his address to the Senate he has held a high place in the hopes of the renascent Polish nation. He can speak to the submerged Slavs of Austria-Hungary, taking advantage of the fact that we are not actually at war with the Dual Monarchy, making capital of the fact that millions of American citizens are related intimately to millions of Austria-Hungary's subjects. These facts are elements of our strength. They are what Bismarck called " imponderables " but of supreme importance in time of war. The neglect of just these imponderables, as every one knows, has marked the failure of German diplomacy.

Lord Robert Cecil's speech in the House of Commons last week showed an almost German failure to appreciate the importance of psychological factors in war strategy. It would be hard to imagine an utterance more calculated to alienate the sympathy of the idealistic democracy of Russia and to discourage the profound liberalism of America. It was a disruptive statement; in tone and substance it must tend to widen rather than close the cleavage between the Russian Revolution and the western Powers. It was the kind of thing which unites the enemy and weakens the Alliance. Fortunately the United States immediately dissociated itself from it in a semi-official notice.

Our hands are free, and the saving of the situation in the east falls largely upon the United States. Saving it means two things: keeping Russia actively interested in the war and arousing discontent in Central Europe. It may be possible by the right kind of dramatic diplomacy at once to solidify the Alliance and to weaken the Middle-European Empires. All the signs indicate that the war-driven peoples of the east are listening for a word of understanding from the democracy to which so many of their best have gone in search of liberty.

Diplomacy of this kind has only one object—the prevention of a German victory, and it should not for an instant be confused with pacifist agita-

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tion which wants peace no matter what the consequences. The politics which underlies the need for diplomatic intervention in the Near East is this: If Prusso-Germany establishes the Mid-European Empire it will be on the basis of her military prestige, of economic advantages, and of fear on the part of the peoples of southeastern Europe that the Allies contemplate their conquest and disintegration. In order to weaken this bloc in the heart of Europe two great things are necessary: Prusso-Germany must be stopped in her effort to dictate peace, and the submerged peoples must be enticed away from her by a clear assurance that the Allies contemplate a Europe in which they can be safe, prosperous and free. Since the Russian Revolution such a Europe is possible, and America's entrance into the war is an added guaranty of the fundamental liberalism of the Alliance.

Tariff Plans of Congress

IN forming its plans for the first war revenue bill, the Ways and Means Committee of the House estimated that increases in the customs duties could be made to yield two hundred million dollars. The distribution of this sum meant a more than usually difficult problem in tariff legislation, for it involved the balancing of war needs with the considerations of international policy. The least sensible way of going about it was to put on a horizontal increase along the whole scale, regardless of what imports could best bear the additional duty.

It was this method which the Ways and Means Committee chose. As it began the framing of the revenue bill, certain suggestions as to the customs provisions, the result of informal conference with the Tariff Commission, came to it from the Treasury Department. So far as was possible in a hastily arranged program, these suggestions discriminated between wisely and unwisely levied duties. The Committee ignored them. A Democratic member proposed, instead, the scheme of laying on a tariff in the way paint is laid on, with a duty of ten per cent upon all articles now admitted free, and an indiscriminate increase of ten per cent upon those already taxed. With this idea a number of the Republican members were at once in accord. They acclaimed it as a recognition of the principle of protection. And since several Democrats approved the simplicity and lack of confusion in the proposal, a majority was effected. A few members protested, declaring that the plan did not recognize the needs and responsibilities set up by the war. But the Republicans were fighting for a principle, they said, the principle of protection, and the bill was reported to the House. "Your committee," states the report, "realizes that this tax [the customs tax] is not scientifically nor equitably adjusted." Nor is it adjusted so as to contribute to the strategy of the war for which it raises revenue.

The case of tin is typical. Crude tin, imported chiefly from the Straits Settlements, is indispensable to the canning industry. A week ago, in a speech in the Senate, Mr. Fernald said, "Within an hour information has come to me that every cannery of food in the country to-day is shut down on account of the lack of cans." Of this shortage the Committee on Ways and Means has taken no account. It has placed upon tin the same increase of tariff as upon silks and laces. With the inventiveness of the nation taxed to find methods of supplying food to the Allies, the Committee proposes the further embarrassment of restrictions on importing a necessary product of which the country is almost destitute. The same reasoning has been applied to other requisite materials. Nickel is essential as a steel alloy in the making of armor plate, cannon and shells. Practically no nickel is produced in the United States. But instead of encouraging its importation in every way possible, the revenue bill proposes the handicap of a ten per cent tax on every dollar's worth. Copper, at the present time interchangeable on the Mexican and Canadian borders, tungsten, an essential for ordnance, zinc and brass—of these there is need for as much as can be had, at as low cost as possible, and without the discouragement of a tax. A duty on explosives, also carried in the bill, is inherently ridiculous at this time.

The most rudimentary coöperation is lacking. The war is directed against the submarine; until some method of destruction is discovered, the only way to defeat it is to build merchant ships faster than they can be sunk. Yet for the Shipping Board's plans to construct a fleet of wooden ships the revenue bill makes no allowances. It taxes lumber, just when the importation of lumber from Canada has an unprecedented need of encouragement. Other essential Canadian imports meet the same barrier. The chief hope of an increased stock of newsprint paper has been in the prospect of effective competition between American and Canadian producers. The American stock must now serve additional purposes; simultaneously a restriction is levied upon imported paper. Canadian foodstuffs, agricultural implements, horses for farms and armies, have a tax placed upon them just as they come to be of maximum desirability. Even gold and silver bullion will, in the terms of the Committee bill, be subject to a duty. Proposals as shortsighted as these are not to be ex-

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plained on the ground that the revenue bill was brought into Congress as a skeleton plan, meant to be perfected in the course of its consideration. For in that case there was even more reason for the initial adoption of any suggestions the Tariff Commission might offer. Changes made on the floor of the House are made without recourse to a trained opinion.

The shortcomings in the customs provisions of the revenue bill are not the only indications of disregard on the part of Congress for the Commission which it has established to counsel it in matters of tariff legislation. On the day on which the war resolution was reported to the House, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means wrote to the Tariff Commission, asking for "suggestions in view of the present conditions, in connection with possible revenue measures." One of the first of such measures which should have had consideration was the matter of interim legislation. It is a common practice, when increased customs duties are threatening, for importers to seek the benefit of the existing lower rates by withdrawing from bond, and importing directly for consumption, more goods than would ordinarily be introduced. The government accordingly loses revenue during the period when the precise terms of the bill are being settled upon. Nor do the benefits of the lower duties accrue to the consumer. For, when the time comes to sell, the level of prices is fixed by the higher rates which have subsequently become effective. The only purposes served are the speculative purposes of the trader.

The need of interim legislation covering the present period was pointed out by the Tariff Commission in a report sent to the Committee on Ways and Means shortly after the war had been declared. The Commission recalled what had happened at the time of the Spanish-American War. The emergency revenue act of 1898 was introduced on April 26th, and became effective on the 14th of June. One of its provisions increased the duty on manufactured tobacco from six cents to twelve cents a pound. During the seven weeks while the bill was being debated, the withdrawals of manufactured tobacco from warehouses amounted to fifty-five million pounds, as compared with forty million during the same period of the preceding year. The sum of $3,300,000 was accordingly lost to the government, above that yielded from the six cent rate. The total amount lost on fermented liquors and tobacco imports was almost nine million dollars.

It was the advice of the Tariff Commission that in the present instance adequate interim legislation should precede the introduction of any revenue measure. Great Britain, France and Italy have legislation or legislative procedure which protects the national revenue from evasions of this sort. New or increased taxes are collected provisionally, while the revenue bill is pending, subject to refund if it should fail. The rights of those who have contracted to furnish articles at a fixed price are protected by an authorization to add the increased customs duty to the purchase price stipulated in the contract, in the absence of any express agreement to the contrary. In this country it might be advisable, on account of the greater freedom of Congress in writing new sections into the bill, not to follow the European custom of collecting interim taxes. Instead of making actual collections, the government might better require the giving to the Secretary of the Treasury of surety bonds to guarantee the payment of duties as finally provided for.

If the rights of those who have assumed contractual obligations are protected, there is no reason why Congress should not at once make the increased customs duties and internal revenue taxes effective. Interim legislation does more than protect the government from evasions; it has the advantage of establishing the higher rates in a period when the value of imports and the withdrawals from bond are normal. Business conditions and relations must to a certain extent be disturbed by increases in customs duties and excise rates. It is preferable that the necessary changes should be made without advance notice, when capital is not being wastefully employed in the purpose of avoiding the pending legislation.

It is the possible disturbance of business conditions which, in the present consideration of the revenue bill, has become the chief concern of many members of Congress. If the proposals of the Tariff Commission had been adopted before any revenue legislation had been introduced, the unsettling effects of the present bill, so far as customs increases go, would to a great extent have been avoided; for, with evasion impossible, there would have been no purpose in taking capital from its customary employment. There is still occasion for the enactment of interim legislation, since it must be some time before the revenue bill can be passed in both houses and the conference report agreed to. It is doubtful, however, whether Congress can readily be shifted from the plan of procedure which has been mapped out for it. That this country must profit by the experience of Great Britain and that the various governmental agencies must coöperate, have been the slogans of many addresses in Congress since the war began. But in the matter of interim legislation, embodying a considerable amount of British experience and a working coöperation with the Tariff Commission, there has been

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little tendency to follow the theories that make such excellent watchwords.

A fundamental factor in the construction of a securer peace is the tariff legislation that will be enacted during the war, and in the period of reorganization immediately following it. A narrow imperialistic policy can make waste of the generous sacrifices that our going in will involve. A policy guided by wisdom and a willingness to forsake criterions which are now being proved unreliable will go far toward setting up a less precarious order. So far, the results of neglecting the counsel of a trained commission have been a poorly drawn tariff revision and a lack of interim legislation. With such a beginning there is need for pressure to be brought to bear, lest Congress continue to plunge ahead in tariff matters with no consideration for the body which should stand as a safeguard agaist the adoption of an outworn theory of politics.

American Soldiers for France

FRANCE alone of the belligerent Powers can look upon the war as a simple if heartbreaking problem. Germans may disagree on the question of annexations and indemnities; Italians may disagree as to the feasibility of holding the Dalmatian coast against the secular pressure of a non-Italian hinterland; Russians may disagree as to the desirability of winning Constantinople, recovering Poland or conquering Galicia; Britons may disagree as to the solution of the problems centering in the Austrian and Turkish Empires and the German colonial dominions. For the French there can be no serious differences of opinion or division of purposes. The hereditary foe must be beaten and hurled back from French soil. As Frenchmen see it, there can be no peace until the Germans have been forced to evacuate not only northern France, but the whole of Alsace-Lorraine. The cost may be terrible, but France is ready to pay, to her last drop of blood.

There is nothing in the world to-day more admirable than this French heroism and singleness of purpose. But the French demand something more from the world, and especially from us her newest allies, than admiration. They demand that we should see the immediate military problem in precisely the same light that France sees it. Indeed, it seems hardly credible to them that we could take any other view of the war. Accordingly, the manner of American participation appears to the French as determinable by a simple logic. We represent an immense man power animated by purposes identical with the French. In effect, we are annexed reserves of ten million potential fighting men. The French have already the officers, the fighting formation, the equipment. These are fairly permanent assets. Their chief wasting asset, to be constantly replaced, is men. Now just as they have drawn steadily upon their own reserves to supply wastage, until these reserves are all but exhausted, why should they not draw upon us, their new reserve? Let American recruits be hurried to France as promptly as possible, to be given the minimum of training behind the lines that will fit them for a place in the existing French formations. Thus the danger that the French lines may wear thin will be obviated. The flow of French blood will be promptly counterbalanced by an infusion of American. Perhaps at first a score of Americans would be incorporated in each French company. Later the American elements of a number of companies, in so far as they survived, might indeed be consolidated into purely American companies, seasoned by fighting at the side of the French. At a still later stage, American regiments, brigades, divisions might be formed in a similar manner. This is the substance of General Pétain's project for American participation. It is not new. The United States had hardly entered the war before similar projects were broached by other French officers. And it must be admitted that General Pétain's project offers great technical advantages. In no other way can American man power be so promptly brought to bear against the Germans. No doubt by adopting the project we could have at the opening of next spring an army in France quite fitted to hold an allotted section of the line. More time will be required if we follow our own devices in building up an army.

General Pétain recognizes that there might arise certain problems involving national sensibilities. Would Americans be willing to fight in the French army, under the French flag? These problems, however, General Pétain regards as not insoluble. It could be so managed that our men would fight under their own flag and the national military autonomy could in some fashion be preserved. And indeed if nothing stood in the way of the adoption of the plan but national sensibilities, we should not long hesitate. American soldiers would regard it as sufficiently honorable to fight for a time in the French army, under French officers. They would probably prefer to charge behind a French barrage rather than behind a purely American barrage that would at first inevitably be less effective. The obstacles to incorporating American soldiers in the French army are of quite another order.

The American public is not yet inured to the hideous cost of military operation on the western front. A French general may sacrifice a division of French soldiers for a gain of terrain that he

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counts worth the cost. If it appears in the sequel that he has overvalued the gain or underestimated the cost, he is responsible to his own people. If American divisions or divisions made up in part of Americans are to be sacrificed, the American public will feel that the decision ought to lie with American officers, responsible to our nation. Our commanders may prove more lavish of the lives of our men than the French commanders. But they will have to answer to us for their costly strategy, as Grant would have had to answer for his ruthlessness if the Richmond campaign had been a failure. The wasteful employment of American soldiers under foreign command would produce a profound impression at home. It might easily lead to a revocation of the conscription law.

But the chief obstacle to the incorporation of American soldiers in the French army lies not in domestic politics, but in international. Sympathizing as we do with French aims in this war, they are not our aims, any more than they are the aims of Italy, Russia or England. It is our aim as that of all our allies to beat Germany. But we shall have our own view of what constitutes German defeat. The time will come when the Allies will have to consider whether a tolerable peace can be made at once or whether another great offensive, to exact sterner terms, will be worth the cost. In this decision, involving perhaps hundreds of thousands of American lives, we intend to have a voice. And we shall have a voice only if we have an entirely independent army, holding a specific part of the line, coöperating with the armies of our allies, but reserving the same freedom of choice that is now reserved by the British and Belgians in France, and by the French and British around Saloniki. This independence we should find great difficulty in achieving if we permitted our soldiers first to filter into the structure of the French army, later to be extricated so far as practical fighting conditions permitted. Our insistence upon our military autonomy must delay somewhat the relief we shall bring to France. In itself this fact must be regarded with profound regret. But a more precipitate policy might easily set in motion currents of misgiving that would be much more prejudicial to the cause of the Allies than any reasonable delay could be. After all, even with the maximum possible American assistance, a military decision can not be reached this year. If the war is not ended earlier by negotiation, American military power will be most needed next summer. And if that power is to be exerted to its utmost, the manner of American intervention must be determined by broad considerations of policy capable of commanding the unqualified support of the American people.

The Employers' I. W. W.

SO far as we have been able to learn, the National Association of Manufacturers shares with the I. W. W. the singular distinction of opposing the industrial truce inaugurated by the American Federation of Labor at a meeting of its executive committee on March 12th. Last Tuesday a number of the largest American employers gathered with representatives of organized labor at the American Federation building in Washington to formulate a basis of coöperation that would put an end to strikes and lockouts for the duration of the war. On the same day, the National Association of Manufacturers in convention at the Waldorf-Astoria enthusiastically applauded Mr. Frederick J. Koster, President of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, when he appealed to them, in the name of "true leadership," to stiffen their lines for a nation-wide offensive against the American Federation of Labor.

Mr. Koster was easily the most impressive figure in the convention. He dominated his audience by his magnificent physical presence, by his fighting ardor and his boldness in voicing their suppressed emotions. He has inherited the late Mr. Baer's religious faith in the superior ability of the men who have succeeded in business. He believes that the nation's security depends upon their unfaltering leadership. After the convention had scattered, the reporters gathered about him as the man of all the assemblage who could speak with inspired authority.

In Mr. Koster's opinion, the "better element" in the industrial world of America is paralyzed to-day by the irresponsible domination of organized labor. "No matter what we do," he said, "we are confronted by a tremendously powerful national organization, which has become the dominant thing in the life of this nation, not only in politics, but in all departments. We have many fairly powerful organizations such as this splendid one. But the National Association of Manufacturers is, after all, an isolated unit. We haven't anything as yet that is fit to cope with such an organization as the American Federation of Labor. And it must be created."

Mr. Koster received the applause due to one who is no mere theorist but who speaks out of successful practical experience. For years, he said, the "better element" in San Francisco, like the "better element" in the nation, had suffered itself to be intimidated by the class domination of irresponsible labor unions. The water-front, "which is the essence of San Francisco," had fallen under a vicious political control which "crept into the saddle through catering to a certain class in its

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supposed interests." As with the water-front, so with transportation and all other vital channels of the community's industrial life. This condition had continued until Mr. Koster became President of the Chamber of Commerce. Under his fearless leadership, the terrorized business men had come out of hiding. The membership of the Chamber had grown by thousands. A Committee on Law and Order, selected exclusively from the ranks of the "better element," had undertaken to restore the "orderly processes of law" to their ancient rightful authority. Counsel had been retained to supplement the erudition of the District Attorney's office in the prosecution of labor cases. A million-dollar fund had been raised to break "class domination" by establishing the open-shop principle and thus to recover to intimidated employees their constitutional liberties. An ordinance had been carried by popular vote making picketing illegal so that the citizens of San Francisco might be spared the shameful evidence of private quarrels on the public streets. And all gumshoe and back-stair work had been tabooed. If the Chamber of Commerce had had anything to say to the public, it had said it openly through paid advertisements. It had paid for newspaper space—in order that it might be above suspicion of attempting to bias the press!

In urging the National Association of Manufacturers to rescue the country from class domination, Mr. Koster counseled moderation and a Christian spirit. "We have gone into this matter," he said, "without rancor or hostility. We have felt that there devolved upon us the duty of true leadership, that we should approach the problem with a generous attitude, realizing fully the necessity of workmen's organizations, realizing the right of every reasonable and legitimate use of the power and influence of organization upon the working people, but undertaking to create, on the other hand, a spirit of fairness and firmness in dealing with them." Labor unions may exist—at their peril—but they should no longer be recognized, except under compulsion. Strikes may be called, but picketing should be outlawed. Labor organizations are free to exercise "every reasonable influence upon the working people"; but if there is to be class domination of the nation's political machinery, the nation's security demands that it should be the domination of the "better element."

This is the program which received the applause of the National Association of Manufacturers at the moment when representative employers, including representatives of the Association itself, were the guests of the American Federation of Labor in Washington at a conference called to formulate a program of peaceful and orderly co-operation. While the manufacturers applauded Mr. Koster, thousands of tons of foodstuffs were going to waste at a Pennsylvania Railroad pier on the North River, due to a spontaneous strike of freight handlers which could not be adjusted because the men were not organized. In England, the threatened strike of the machinists in munitions plants was being adjusted through the coöperation of trade union leaders with whom the government had entered into a collective agreement for the adjustment of disputes through arbitration. In Washington, Secretary Wilson of the Department of Labor, with the manifest concurrence of trade union leaders, was presenting to Congress a bill designed to substitute joint industrial control through arbitration for the cruder methods of lockouts and strikes. While patriotic men everywhere were earnestly seeking to introduce the healing spirit of democracy into industrial relations, the National Association of Manufacturers appeared to stand out with the I. W. W. for unrelenting class warfare.

It is inconceivable that men of such tested experience and ability as the members of the Association should not come to see the folly of such a course. Surely when men like Mr. Gompers and his associates in the American Federation of Labor take the initiative in waiving their firmly held convictions against all forms of compulsory arbitration to stabilize production for the period of the war, the organized manufacturers will not persist in their refusal to recognize the unions as joint guarantors of the industrial truce. They are right in holding that the security of the nation depends upon their leadership. But what the country has a right to expect of them to-day is leadership in constructive coöperation. The civilized way to end class domination is to accept the democratic principle of joint industrial control.

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Munitions

WHAT are the lessons to be learned from the British Commission in the matter of the getting of supplies for our army and navy? The personnel of our army and navy is assured. The task is to get the supplies to keep pace with the personnel. On that task our eyes should be fixed. Finance is fundamental but it is background and personnel is now background. Supplies are the imminent problem, the critical problem; and it is generally admitted at Washington that unexampled energy and perhaps unexampled reorganization will be necessary if we are not to see our soldiers ready before their equipment is ready—which would mean a great delay in ending the war.

In these circumstances many people are proposing, with great and increasing force, that the whole getting of supplies, whether howitzers or shoe-laces, shall be transferred bodily from military or naval hands to civilian hands. They remark that during the recent recruiting campaign the army was unable to get even an adequate supply of enlistment-blanks, and citizens interested in recruiting were sometimes obliged actually to print enlistment-blanks at their own expense. If the commercial purchasing skill of the army is not equal to the getting of enlistment-blanks in a country in which, after all, there is a considerable stock of paper and of ink, what ground is there for confidence that it will be equal to the getting of howitzers in a country in which the manufacturing facilities for the production of howitzers are so meager as to be gravely alarming?

It is argued further that the hands of the army —and of the navy—will be full to overflowing with the very great labor of distributing, within the army and navy, the suddenly expanded mass of supplies produced on their behalf and delivered to them by the country. In the British army there is an organization called the Army Service Corps. It seems to give its time principally to carrying supplies, within the army, from the bases behind the front to the soldiers in or near action. This Army Service Corps now has some 10,000 officers and some 200,000 men. A proportional expansion is bound to take place within the Quartermaster Corps of our own army for work in America itself as well as for work in France. The mere distribution of supplies, of scores of different sorts, to the soldiers in our training camps on this side of the Atlantic will, it is argued, tax the powers of our Quartermaster Corps to the utmost. Why not confide the outside task of commercial purchase to new civilian agencies from outside?

Recently a considerable number of soldiers of the United States, at Springfield, Illinois, though called to camp by the army, were left without blankets and were stricken, in many cases, by pneumonia and by other sicknesses. Perhaps the army had failed to buy enough blankets or perhaps, having bought enough blankets, it nevertheless failed to distribute them. In either case the moral drawn by the friends of civilian purchase is the same. They conclude that if the army learns to distribute blankets and other supplies successfully among our hundreds of thousands of new soldiers, it will be stretching its capacity for administration and its capacity for expansion to their farthest limits; and, if it attempts also to continue to do the commercial purchasing of ultimately billions of dollars of supplies, it will break down disastrously.

It is not too much to say that this is the basic practical question in Washington to-day for the conduct of the war. What light is thrown on it by the British Commission?

One must say that at first it is a confused light. The British navy, it appears, continues, on the whole, to buy its own supplies, all of them, from ships to sugar, itself, just as it did before the war. It does, indeed, occasionally now do a little purchasing through the Ministry of Munitions; but as a general rule it may be stated that the Ministry of Munitions is a civilian organ which operates virtually exclusively on behalf of the army and that the buying and the making of things for the navy is still directed by the navy itself. Apparently therefore the principle of civilian purchase has not commended itself to Great Britain for its "senior service."

On further inquiry, however, it becomes clear that the case of the British navy is only slenderly a precedent for us. The British navy is governed by the Admiralty, and the internal organization of the Admiralty includes many elements not found in our Navy Department. Among these elements is the permanent civilian civil servant, holding positions in which the navy comes into contact with commerce and industry.

The Director of Naval Construction in the Admiralty is a civilian. The Director of Contracts and Purchases is a civilian. The Director of Victualling is a civilian. The Director of Dockyards, the Director of Transport, the Accountant General, are civilians.

Further, and more importantly, the British

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Admiralty is much more closely knit than our Navy Department. It has a permanent secretary, a civilian, who ties all its departments together. And the Lords of the Admiralty themselves tie all those departments together again by sitting as a board. Three of them are civilians and four of them are seamen. The seamen, in practice, have more control over the actual fleet itself than our seamen have; and the civilians have departments of their own, largely non-nautical in their character, for which they are directly administratively responsible.

Our Navy Department is a set of bureaus headed by navy men who are never allowed to have the joint responsibility or the joint honor which is conferred upon the seamen in the board of the Admiralty and who are held together only by transitory secretaries and assistant secretaries about whom it may be said that they are the only civilians of importance in the Navy Department and that they are responsible, not for the discharge of any specific group of special non-nautical duties, but for the general administration of the whole Navy Department, the whole fleet, in matters nautical, in matters non-nautical, universal, absolute.

Our Navy Department is a naval bureaucracy, or series of bureaucracies, dominated by an executive civilian autocracy. The British Admiralty is a bureaucracy civilian as well as naval, dominated by an administrative board naval as well as civilian. The differences between the two situations is so extreme that it is manifest that any conclusion from one to the other is extremely difficult, if not totally impossible.

When we come to the army, we are on surer ground. No such gap separates the organization of the British army from the organization of the American army as exists between the British Admiralty and the American Navy Department. What has been found by Great Britain to be advisable for the British army might well be found by the United States to be advisable for the American army. Even here, though, the light is not at first perfectly clear.

The Ministry of Munitions, though it makes and buys all munitions used by the British army, does not provide it with its non-munitions, such as blankets and tents and boots and bully beef and so on. Such things continue to be bought by the army itself, through its Contracts Branch. The Contracts Branch is headed, it is true, by a civilian. Yet it remains part of the army, part of the War Office.

The reason for this inconsistency turns out, however, to be a purely personal one, or, at any rate, one that has nothing to do with any principle of organization. The buying of non-munitions by the Contract Branch of the War Office was proceeding satisfactorily. The man who was doing it was getting it done. Therefore he simply was allowed to go on getting it done. Otherwise non-munitions would properly have followed guns and shells and aeroplanes and all other immediate fighting instruments into the new Ministry of Munitions; and the Ministry of Munitions would have been a Ministry of army supplies, complete.

The British Commission alleges no principle of organization which would have forbidden that development. On the contrary, the conversation of the British Commission, though it is carefully confined to a relation of recent British history and as carefully avoids any direct advice about American institutions, indicates beyond doubt that the principle on which the Ministry of Munitions is based is regarded as being thoroughly sound and vigorously successful and that the principle in question, the principle of absolute civilian control of manufacturing and of purchasing, is regarded as applicable, in the proper personal circumstances, to all manufacturing and to all purchasing whatsoever.

The degree to which that principle has been used, within the Ministry of Munitions itself, is really quite astonishing. The present head of the Ministry of Munitions, Christopher Addison, is a doctor. He made a considerable reputation in Great Britain as a man of public interests at the time of the discussion of Lloyd George's Health Insurance bill. Now he makes and buys Great Britain's munitions to the satisfaction of the Empire. The representatives of the Ministry of Munitions in the British Commission at Washington are men who used to be in academic life. They are now discharging great commercial and industrial duties. Civilians who are not business men at all have evidently been found capable of taking important parts in a civilian business task which proved unsuited to the military machinery of the War Office. As for civilians of genuine business experience, they naturally are numerous in the management of the various sections into which the Ministry of Munitions is divided. The personnel of that Ministry, at its controlling points, seems to be almost completely civilian.

Even more remarkable is the fact that the actual design, the actual military technical design, of the munitions desired by the War Office is done under the direction of the civilians of the Ministry of Munitions. The War Office decides that it needs, let us say, a howitzer, a certain number of howitzers, of a certain size, capable of accomplishing certain results. It communicates its desire, in terms more or less general, to the Ministry of

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Munitions. The Ministry of Munitions then proceeds, through its own employees, to make the design of that howitzer, the first real working picture of it, as well as to let the contract, subsequently, for the manufacturing of it. Certainly, in making the design, it uses for employees certain persons trained in the military handling of artillery. But those persons belong, and are subject, not to the War Office but to the Ministry of Munitions, a civilian manufacturing and purchasing business institution. The principle of civilian control could hardly be stretched farther or applied more drastically.

One must observe, finally, that it is the Ministry of Munitions, and not the Admiralty, and not the Contracts Branch of the War Office, that has attacked the most difficult problem of the war within Great Britain and that has won the war's most dazzling economic victory. No matter what may be said for the purchasing done by the Admiralty, no matter what may be said for the purchasing done by the Contracts Branch of the War Office, it is the purchasing done by the Ministry of Munitions that has been the world's wonder for scope and speed and fearless imaginative action leading to unprecedented practical results.

In these circumstances, in the light of the lessons to be learned from Great Britain, and in the light of the lessons to be learned from our own Army Department and from our own Navy Department, as shown, in the case of the army, by, for instance, its difficulty in getting supplies for the National Guard in Texas last year and as shown, in the case of the navy, by, for instance, its difficulty in getting aeroplanes and aeroplane-stations at all adequate to its instant needs, the argument becomes strong indeed for the immediate creation of a new governmental organ at Washington which shall be thoroughly civilian in its control and which shall be the equivalent not merely of a Ministry of Munitions for the army but of a Ministry of Munitions and of non-munitions both, for army and navy both—a Ministry of army and navy supplies—a Ministry of War Industries.

The principle which demands such a Ministry is so persuasive as to be almost irresistible. Yet a great practical personal question remains. In what way shall such a Ministry be brought into being? I said in these pages a few weeks ago that an organization embodying civilians for the purchase of aeroplanes was creating itself. That organization has now developed into an Aircraft Production Board. Similarly, without new legislation, there has come into existence, under the Council of National Defense, a General Munitions Board, embodying civilians, which even now, both for munitions and for non-munitions and both for army and navy, increasingly performs the tasks of a Ministry of War Industries.

Would it be wise to destroy these boards? Would it not be better to develop them? A single decisive act by the President and by the six Cabinet Officers who constitute the Council of National Defense, conferring upon these boards whatever personal powers they may now lack, would, without any new legislation at all, transform them at once from bodies already enormously influential into bodies unquestionably authoritative and effective. By this route the end in view could be reached without shattering present accomplishments and without running any risk of those possibly disastrous mistakes in new personnel which often accompany "clean slates" and which have painfully evidenced themselves in the cases of several recent "clean slates" at Washington.

The critical inquiry then becomes: What are the personalities and what are the accomplishments of the Aircraft Production Board and of the General Munitions Board?

WILLIAM HARD.

The Tonnage Situation

THERE is no one who does not know that the ocean shipping situation is bad, and certain to grow worse before it grows better. Just how bad it is can not be precisely determined, because there are no data available to the public by which the minimum requirements of the Allies can be measured. The statement has been made by persons whose official position ought to lend weight to their opinions that unless the submarine is eliminated or a tremendous acceleration of shipbuilding in the United States takes place, England will be beaten in eight months. One infers that this calculation is based on the assumption of a million tons sunk monthly, or with due allowance for possible construction, a reduction of six million tons in the eight months' period. Have we really reached a point where a reduction of six million tons in ocean shipping will decide the fate of England, and therewith the fate of France and Belgium, Italy and Serbia, Russia and Rumania and the United States as well? It is surely worth reviewing the statistics of ocean shipping before we accept a conclusion so alarming.

According to Lloyds Register the steam tonnage of Great Britain on July 1st, 1916, was 20,463,881. America was credited with 5,116,215 tons; France, with 1,851,120; Japan, 1,847,684; Italy, 1,685,720; Russia, 875,146. Of this total of nearly 32,000,000 tons much, however, was un-

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available for sea transport. Over half of the American tonnage is specialized to lake, river or minor coastwise traffic. A large part of the Russian shipping may be assumed to be tied up in the Baltic and Black Seas. The figures for France and Italy must be considerably reduced to allow for shipping available only for Mediterranean trade. British shipping also contains elements that ought to be excluded from serious consideration on account of their adaptation to specific peace-time purposes. At a minimum, 5,000,000 tons must on such grounds be deducted from the 32,000,000 total. And we should be safer in deducting 6,000,000. This would leave us with about 26,000,000 tons to supply the military and commercial needs of the Allies, if there had been no shrinkage since last July.

But the shrinkage has been considerable. The average life of miscellaneous ocean shipping can hardly run above twenty years. Ten months' natural wastage, therefore, would amount to not less than 1,000,000 tons on a total of 26,000,000. To this we must add submarine losses of about 3,000,000 tons. As an offset to this we have new construction we may estimate liberally at 1,500,000 tons for Great Britain, the United States and Japan. Accordingly the Allied group has 2,500,000 tons less shipping than a year ago. At most it now commands 23,500,000 tons of shipping fit for ocean transportation.

It may perhaps be objected that the totality of this Allied shipping can not be regarded as available for the purpose of supplying western Europe, since each nation has other purposes of its own that demand certain reservations upon its shipping. It can not be taken for granted that even England, France and Italy work together without the least consideration of particularistic interests, commercial and political. The United States is still farther from complete unification of aims with the Allied group, and Japan perhaps farthest of all from such unification. But we are considering not what is actually happening, but what may be expected to happen in an extremity. So long as there is a surplus of shipping above the absolute requirements of the war and of the civilian activities contributing to the war, we may expect each country to give some consideration to the profits of maintaining ordinary commerce. These will not be abandoned until necessity compels. But they will be abandoned if the sacrifice is necessary to the prosperity of the Allied cause.

Besides the shipping of the countries now constituting the alliance against Germany, there was in July, 1916, an aggregate of about 6,500,000 tons under the flags of the Scandinavian countries, Holland and Spain, which served chiefly the purposes of the Allied group, either through the provision of food and raw materials in exchange for manufactures, or as common carriers of world trade, now almost an Allied monopoly. In proclaiming unrestricted submarine warfare Germany was counting on the probability that much of this neutral tonnage would be deterred from undertaking voyages that might benefit the Allies. The contiguous neutrals, Holland and Denmark, seem to have met the German expectation fairly well. Neither has been in a position to disregard at once the risks of submarine attacks and German diplomatic pressure. Sweden and Spain, as throughout the war, have been inclined to play their own hands craftily. They have kept an eye to the possibility that the loss of earnings from holding their ships idle may be greatly overbalanced by the profits to be reaped after the war by nations which have their shipping intact. Norway alone has kept all her ships on the sea and taken her losses, which have been severe.

What the Allies have lost in shipping accommodations through the tying up of neutral shipping can only be guessed. Of the group Norway is most nearly specialized as a common carrier. Her two and a quarter million tons are far in excess of any needs of her own trade. And Norway, as has been indicated, continues to fill her traditional place in spite of the submarine. The remaining four neutrals are not wholly off the seas. They are still of some use to the Allies. Possibly their cautious policy has cost the Allies what amounts to the use of a million or a million and a half of tonnage. It can hardly mean more than this.

In the last ten months, then, the Allied group has suffered a net loss of 2,500,000 tons through sinkings, and a virtual loss of perhaps 1,500,000 frightened from the seas. There has doubtless also been a loss in efficiency of tonnage operated, through the necessity of feeling out safe routes, etc. That the resultant shortage of tonnage has been keenly felt is not to be doubted. The military forces at Saloniki would hardly have remained so quiescent if it had been an easy matter to supply the munitions and men that an active campaign would waste. Nor is it probable that Italy would so long have remained quiescent if sufficient coal for her industry and transportation had been provided. There is a large stock of wheat in Australia that can't be moved for want of bottoms. Decidedly, the ocean shipping situation has already reached an acute phase.

But it is a long leap from an acute phase evidenced by the lopping off of the less vital services to the complete breakdown that the Germans contemplate. England and France must be fed and

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supplied with the essential materials for equipment and munitions, so far as they draw these materials from overseas. Twenty million tons of foodstuffs would insure them against starvation. Two million tons of cotton would answer, at a pinch, for clothing and explosives. Add another eight million tons for hides and leather, nitrates, rubber, the finer metals, and whatever other essential materials England and France can not produce. Some thirty million tons of freight at a minimum must be moved across the sea if the Allied cause is not to be brought to the verge of collapse. Double the figure, for safety's sake, and ten million tons of shipping should still suffice for the work. Much can be done to increase the efficiency of tonnage through unified control and systematic attention to the problem of expediting loading and unloading, repairs, etc. The Allies command 23,500,000 tons, and even if sinkings continue at their present rate, will command 17,500,000 at the end of eight months, without acceleration of construction. In addition, the Allies will continue to enjoy the services of some millions of tons of neutral shipping. The Norwegians will defy the submarine, as now, and the other neutrals are not likely to modify their policy in the direction of greater caution.

Nevertheless, 17,500,000 tons would be near the danger point. A large part of this tonnage has to be set apart for the service of the army and navy. It has been estimated, without visible data, that about ten million tons of British shipping are thus diverted from overseas transportation. Probably the war services still use tonnage rather lavishly and could put up with a less amount. But at best the amount of shipping that could be released for overseas transportation would not be more than sufficient to afford a safe margin in the supplying of the essentials of life and warfare, if sinkings continue unabated for eight months.

In these calculations no allowance has been made for the tonnage required to transport a large American army to France and to provide it adequately with munitions and supplies. But possibly the transportation can be managed with existing shipping. If the American troops are to represent a net addition to the forces arrayed against Germany, instead of releasing for industrial service a corresponding number of French and British soldiers, the munitioning and provisioning of the force will require the continuous employment of a large volume of tonnage. Probably not less than four million tons of shipping will be required to supply the wastage of personnel and material if we are to have a force of a million men in France.

The tonnage situation is not so serious as to threaten the defeat of the Allies in eight months. Even if sinkings continue at the present rate there will still remain afloat at the end of this period more than the indispensable minimum of tonnage. But it must be clear that the Allies—or more specifically England and America—must be prepared at the end of eight months to replace ships as fast as the Germans can sink them, whether the sinkings then amount to a half million tons per month or more. If this can not be done, the war is lost, unless forces now unforeseeable bring about the collapse of Germany in the present year.

ALVIN JOHNSON.

Sentimental Furniture

WHEN I knew Maria years ago, before she married, she was a girl who ran to tastes. I do not affirm that Maria possessed taste; she may have had taste, and she may not; I do not regard that as a subject for friends to inquire into, any more than incomes. But she certainly ran to tastes. She had adored Zola, and she had adored Tennyson, but not at the same time. She had been obsessed at intervals by Turner, by Manet, and by Rossetti. She had had a dreamy honeymoon with Chopin, and a stormy liaison with Tschaikovsky, and a bitter interlude with Wagner; but no musician, indeed no artist of any sort, had ever succeeded in making an honest woman of Maria. She was essentially a free lover. Yet—and this is my point—she would ever be off with the old love before she was on with the new. Her passions did not overlap.

This temporary consistency was particularly notable in furniture. Maria was not rich, she could not indulge herself, and yet in her own room at least she contrived by sacrifice, so to speak, to keep her surroundings up with her. She may have had aspirations she could not gratify; she may have longed for Chippendale or Sheraton, but if so she gave no sign. But she had, quite early, a mission period, when the keynote was massiveness, and the door-knobs were square, and even my own photograph on her dresser had, it seemed to me, a wooden look about it; and then suddenly all this vanished, and cottagey cupboard-like things, unevenly decorated, but green to the very doors, as Wordsworth says, took its place—the chest of drawers was covered with moss-roses, and the bed itself was not so safe as it was painted, and you felt as if you were in a carpenter's shop which had struck up an affair with a studio; and then the cottagey things went too, and were succeeded (Maria's aunt died about this time, and left her four hundred dollars) by Colonial effects—a low-

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boy, and a lop-eared dressing-table which always folded itself humbly at the most inconvenient times —and so on. And the walls kept the pace—they had to. With the mission furniture they were dull blue, and with the cottagey things went chintzes and ruffles, and with the low-boy and the lop-ear went chaste white walls and heavy linen, pure in spirit. To visit Maria's room in those days was often to be surprised, but never to be divided in emotion; whatever you thought of it, you could think only one thing.

But the Boyds (Maria was a Boyd) moved away, and I lost track of her for a time. I heard that she was married, very happily, to a man who was described to me as a cotton-broker, but the description was somehow insufficient; beyond a vague notion that he must have a little white tuft of chinbeard, I couldn't see him. Later Maria and I began to correspond again, and I learned that she was happy, and the cotton-broking, or braking, whichever it is, was quite successful; and then still later, being in her neighborhood, I went to visit her.

The place was placid and comfortable in exterior, but when I was ushered into the library, it is not too much to say that I was shocked. I had a very clear recollection of Maria's ideas; and for the moment I believed I must be in the wrong house. In the center of the room was a square table, with moulded edges. It was evidently of cherry, with what is called, I believe, a mahogany stain; below was a kind of shelf, or subsidiary table, perhaps a foot from the floor. On either side of it was a morris-chair, in mission style, one brown, one black; each had a green rep cushion. There was a very large arm-chair, also, soft and plushy, done in red of a somewhat different shade from the mahogany stain; and a still larger couch, equally soft and plushy, done in dark blue, and looking, except for its arms, rather like a domesticated whale; and on the wall was a black marble clock, which could have, and undoubtedly did, come safely through the panic of '73; and there was a good sized twin-lamp, of the sort which, to use an orchestral term, doubles in brass; and there were pictures. Just as I got round to the pictures, Maria came in.

She was as nice as ever, and we were very glad to see each other; but I think even at first she noticed my surprise. At all events, it was not long before she spoke of it. She said, quite without rancor:

"I married it."

"It looks," I answered, searching for a phrase, "very home-y."

"The word," said Maria, "is homely, not home-y. But I can't help it. You see, John believes in associations. All these things have associations. That clock now"—

So then she told me all about it. Among her neighbors, I gathered, she held up her head bravely. In the first place, none of them knew her past; and in the second place, few of them saw anything unusual in her rooms. They too had associations, or their husbands had. But it was evidently all the more relief to Maria to express herself to me. The damns had burst at last, as you might put it.

"That clock was a wedding present of John's mother's. He learned to tell time by it. Once when he was only six he managed to upset it on his foot, and it broke one of his little toes. He showed me the toe; it is twisted. When he was fourteen he began to be able to repair it, and he has repaired it ever since. Somewhere in a drawer he has quite a little collection of wheels that he has had left over from time to time. The only occasion on which it has been sent to the watch-maker was after I managed to push it off the shelf once, when I was dusting. That cost us eight dollars, and I have never had the strength to upset it again.

"Oh, I have striven. Take the table, for instance. When we had been married a month I had a second-hand man come and look at it while John was out. He offered me three dollars for it, and I had him take it away. When John got home, he saw, of course, that it was gone, and he ate hardly any dinner. After one little outburst, he didn't reproach me. He moped. I stood it for a week; then I went to my man and bought it back. He charged me eleven dollars, and fifty cents more for delivery. But it was worth it to see John's face when he came home that night. I saw him bruise his shin on the lower part, deliberately, twice, just to help him realize that the table was really back again.

"I tell you I have striven. Do you see that vase? No; don't look. John's great-uncle was a ship-captain, and he brought that home from China, or Patagonia—or said he did. Personally I believe he forgot to bring home anything, and bought that in a second-hand shop in Salem on his way up from the vessel. The Salvation Army wagon was here once and when the man was going out I asked him if he could use that vase. He seemed glad to get it. It must be terrible to be poor. He hadn't been gone five minutes when I heard a dreadful altercation in the street, and in came John with the vase and his clothes dusty. It seems he met the wagon at the corner, and seeing the vase recognized it and accused the poor driver of stealing it. I told him the truth. I couldn't let him think that even a Salvation Army man would deliberately *take* such an object. But—well, associations are

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really John's only vice. Sometimes I think all boys should be taught to drink.

"I have, I say, striven; and I have had my triumphs. There were two pieces of Rogers statuary on the mantelpiece. Did you ever see any Rogers groups? There were 'Lincoln and His Cabinet,' and 'The Thorn in the Foot.' The little boy with the thorn had a real tear on his cheek—a clay tear. And the Cabinet were all there, in clay trousers. I didn't know quite what to do. I thought about them so much. It seemed to me if we ever had a son, he would be born with a clay tear on his cheek—or else in trousers. But I didn't dare break them, and when I hid them John found them and put them back on the mantelpiece. So finally I thought of a plan. I had a new mantel put in; and I saw to it that it was too narrow for the Rogers groups! It was a blow to John, but I don't think he suspected me. Oh no, we haven't got them anywhere else. They had always stood on the mantelpiece; and when they *couldn't* stand there any more, they couldn't stand anywhere else. You don't understand associations.

"Oh yes, I'm a happy woman. John isn't obstinate, you know. I could clear this all away, and make a Japanese den of it, with parasols upside down beneath the electric lights, and John wouldn't scold. But he would be sad, and as time went on, he would be sadder. And I can't bear to hurt him. Besides"—Maria shivered—"sometimes I think I'm almost getting to like things his way. There's a sort of sentiment in it; there really is. One gets used to things, and they take root in the heart. It's the same way with ideas, don't you think? Most of us have the strangest collections—conventions inherited from our grandmothers, or shipped in from China, or picked up somewhere in editorial auction-rooms, and the whole lot lived with till they seem almost to harmonize—or don't they? There's the belief that women shouldn't show their ankles in street clothes—do you know, I've got that yet, right in my mental drawing-room. And the theory that watermelon is good to eat—something I found in the country once, and brought home, and now I can't bear to part with it, though I know how any Ruskinian epicure must despise it. And the anti-suffragists—think how many there are with that amazing old carved prejudice standing against the wall, swearing at their social service hangings and their educational rugs—but they simply can't bear to be rid of it. Oh, the sentimental furniture of religion, and how to bring up daughters in perfect innocence, and the protective tariff, and so on, that we accuse kind people actually of *stealing* when we find them taking it out of our houses—well, when I think of those things, too, I don't blame John so much about the green rep cushions and the table."

I had a very pleasant visit with Maria. I didn't understand her exactly; but I'm sure of one thing—she must really love her husband.

J. W. L.

English Labor and the War

IMMEDIATELY after the declaration of war, English trade union leaders took the initiative in promoting industrial peace. Strikes were called off, demands were withdrawn or submitted to arbitration, proselyting stopped. The number of new industrial disputes fell from 99 in July, 1914, to 14 in August; from 836, involving 423,000 workers during the first seven months of the year to 137, involving 23,000 workers, during the last five months. The great triple alliance of the miners, railwaymen and transport workers, which was on the point of dominating the industrial situation in England, was left incomplete. Throughout the nation, organized labor responded to the call for an industrial truce.

But the truce was declared on the tacit understanding that there were to be equal sacrifices on both sides. With the piling up of profits by the munition makers and the sharp rise in food prices, irritation spread among the workers. During the winter, thousands of men in the coal fields, on the docks, in the shipbuilding yards struck in protest against profiteering, overwork and starvation wages. Month after month, the industrial situation grew more acute. The employers' inability to control their own properties and to maintain output finally forced the government to intervene. As a first tentative step toward state control, the government appointed a Committee on Production in Engineering and Shipbuilding Establishments in the hope that the employers and workmen might be brought together on a basis of mutual concession. But negotiations dragged. Output continued to fall short of the requirements of the men at the front. The shortage in shells and guns of heavy calibre threatened to develop into a national scandal. Then the government, cutting through tradition and ancient class prejudice, decided upon a course of action, which, according to Lloyd George, was "absolutely unprecedented" in the history of England.

The government decided to enter into direct

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negotiations with the trade unions as the responsible leaders of labor. In the opinion of the Right Hon. C. W. Bowerman, M. P., Secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, and Mr. James H. Thomas, M. P., General Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen, members of the British Commission, this decision marks a turning-point in the war and a new epoch in the progress of industrial democracy.

Representatives of the chief trade unions were invited to meet with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade "to consider the general position in reference to the urgent need of the country in regard to the large, and a larger, increase in the output of munitions of war, and the steps which the government proposes to take to organize the industries of the country with a view to achieving that end." In response to Lloyd George's appeal, the trade union officials drafted the terms of a collective agreement between organized labor and the government which they were willing to recommend to their members. These terms were later embodied in the Munitions of War bill, which was enacted by Parliament on the 23rd of June. Quite apart from the practical merits of the act, the psychological effect produced upon the workers by the government's unreserved recognition of the unions has proved of incalculable value. It brought the higher ideals of the war home to employer and workmen alike by frankly applying the principle of democratic control to industrial relations. It effectively checked the drift toward industrial anarchy. Under its inspiration, an unprecedented increase in output accompanied an unprecedented period of industrial peace.

The Munitions of War act prohibits strikes and lockouts. If any difference arises between employers and employed about which, after conference, they are unable to agree, it may be reported to the Board of Trade for final adjustment. In its discretion, the Board of Trade may refer any matter in dispute to the Committee on Production, or to a single arbitrator to be agreed upon by the parties or in default of such agreement appointed by the Board, or to a court of arbitration consisting of an equal number of persons representing employers and workmen with a chairman appointed by the Board. If the Minister of Munitions considers it expedient for the purpose of the successful prosecution of the war, he may declare any plant a controlled establishment. In such establishments trade union rules, practices and customs may be suspended subject to the provision that any question as to whether the rule or practice tends to restrict output shall be referred to the Board of Trade for determination either by the Board or by a munitions tribunal. The rules which have been most seriously affected are those relating to the jurisdiction of particular unions, the replacing of skilled by unskilled labor, and the introduction of female and non-union workers. To balance these infringements upon established trade union practices, the act limits the net profits divisible by owners of controlled establishments to an amount exceeding by one-fifth the average amount of net profits for the two financial years next before the outbreak of the war. It provides for the maintenance of the trade union scale of wages. And it carries the government's pledge that "any departure during the war from the practice ruling in the workshops, shipyards, and other industries prior to the war, shall only be for the period of the war."

In spite of the traditional hostility of British workmen to compulsory arbitration, they have given hearty support to the act, not only as a matter of patriotism, but especially because it was adopted after consultation with their own official representatives and with their consent. It is to this point that the labor delegates with the British Commission invariably return whenever a question is raised as to the wisdom of their surrender of trade union practices or as to the possible disintegrating effect of the present system of labor control upon the organized labor movement now and after the war. They insist that the joint control of industry by labor, capital and the government has been the most powerful factor in maintaining industrial peace, and they are confident that the principle of joint control has been so firmly established that it will carry British industry safely through the trying days of reconstruction. The compulsory features of the law will terminate with the war; the democratic spirit in which the law originated, they believe, will survive the war, will cure many of the old hostilities between capital and labor that have crippled the efficiency of English industry, and will open an era of socialized coöperation inspired by the ideals of national service.

By its official recognition of the trade unions, the government set a salutary example to the employers of England and secured the free coöperation of the trade union officials who commanded a machinery for the adjustment of industrial disputes even more effective than that set by the Munitions of War act itself. This coöperation was stimulated by the appointment of trade union leaders to the coalition cabinets of Asquith and Lloyd George, and by the creation of a permanent Ministry of Labor, headed by John Hodge of the Steel Smelters' Union. By these various steps the government acquired a large measure

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of direct control over the rank and file through their own elected officials. Critics of the conduct of the trade union leaders have said that they were flattered into making concessions prejudicial to the best interests of their membership. To this the labor delegates with the British Commission reply that the great mass of the workers are satisfied with the situation and that their confidence in their leaders is attested by the fact that, in spite of the enlistment of five millions of men in the army, the membership of the unions represented in the Trades Union Congress has increased by two hundred thousand during the war.

When asked what practical suggestions for the maintenance of industrial peace they had to offer the administration at Washington, the labor members of the British Commission again reverted to the same point. They believe that the surest guaranty of industrial peace and sustained maximum output would come through official recognition of the responsible leadership of the American trade unions by the American government. By this they mean something more than the appointment of the President of the American Federation of Labor to the Advisory Council of National Defense. The importance of what has already been done, they fully recognize. But what they have in mind is something analogous to the policy of direct negotiation with the executives of the various trade unions adopted by the government of Great Britain. The experience of England, they are convinced, has finally demonstrated that the security of a nation's industries depends upon the extension of joint democratic control through governmental initiative and under the liberal supervision of the state.

ROBERT W. BRUÈRE.

At the Capitol

THE recent show of antagonism on the part of Congress to certain bureaus of war administration has been less the result of a calculated opposition than of irritation at seeing credit for action given to executive offices, hitherto of little importance, while Congress itself is being criticized for its delay in pushing war measures along. There is no doubt but that some of this criticism has been misapplied. Much of the war legislation which has been sent to Congress from the Departments has not been well drawn. It would have been a mistake to endorse offhanded the original draft of the Espionage bill. Nor does the perfection of any measure constitute a reason for its passage without deliberation, and with a few commendatory observations. Senator Lodge is right in his understanding of the business of Congress at this time: "We should be recreant to the people who have elected us if we did not use our utmost efforts to secure the best legislation possible in this crisis of the country's fate."

Unfortunately, much of the criticism which Congress has recently been subjected to does not draw a line between the time rightly spent in deliberation of revolutionary innovations, and that wasted in an easy submission to old habits of indifference and old methods of procedure. It was proper that so far-reaching a measure as the conscription bill should be held up for all honest discussion, even though the major part of it was perfunctory and not meant to influence those who heard it. But there were delays which in no way resulted from genuine deliberation. For instance, as passed by the House the bill fixed the pay of privates at $30 a month, and by the Senate, at $29. Theoretically the conferees of the two houses would have compromised somewhere between the two figures. Instead, acting entirely upon their own initiative, they cut the pay down to $25 a month. When this revision was reported back it aroused a natural opposition in both houses, opened discussion anew, and resulted in the bill's being sent to conference again. It is this sort of delay, imposed by the unauthoritative action of eight conferees, that can bear criticism and against which, at a time when failure to act promotes public irritation, there is reason for protest.

The matter of pay was not the only instance of conference legislation in the conscription measure. As passed by both houses the bill provided for the settlement of exemption by boards of officers locally appointed. Acting under instructions from neither house the conferees struck out this provision and substituted one of their own making. They also assumed the right to clothe the courts with power to punish evasions with a penalty different from that which the two houses had provided in identical terms. To causes such as these, rather than to time devoted to actual deliberation, is chargeable a great part of the delay in the enactment of the conscription bill. Nor are the effects of such irregular considerations limited to that one measure. The Sundry Civil Appropriations bill, which came over from the Sixty-fourth Congress, has been in conference since the 16th of April. The Military Academy Appropriations bill has been held up five weeks, principally on account of two cadets whose cases for readmittance were tacked on to the bill by the Senate conferees. The House has refused to approve of these cases, and the bill is still waiting.

A further source of delay, not to be explained by any desire for thorough deliberation of critical measures, has been the lack of sufficient interest to keep a majority present while measures of this sort are being discussed. Senators rightly declare that the question of food supply must receive prompt and careful consideration; but when the first of the food bills was brought up it could receive neither, because, in the words of Senator Lodge, it was "too important to be considered by a thin Senate." In the House, while the revenue bill was being discussed, there was usually only a handful of members present. The most fundamental issues were settled without a quorum. On one of Mr. Lenroot's amendments, proposing higher rates of income taxation, there were 156 members voting—out of a total of 435. Only 187 votes were cast on the question of whether the provisions for a retroactive tax should be left in the bill; 183 on the important proposal of giving full publicity to income returns. Seventy per cent of the House was not present when a vote was taken on Mr. Good's amendment for raising the excess profits taxes; and eighty per cent on Mr. Shackelford's proposal for a higher basis for income rates.

Added to these factors in delay there has often been a strange misplacement of emphasis, in Congress, since the passage of the war resolution. It is one thing to speak of

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the need for deliberation, and another to devote the good part of a day to deliberating the personal qualifications of two candidates for West Point; one thing to declare that a two billion dollar revenue bill must not be hastily considered, and another to court irrelevancies by refusing to grant the chairman's request that "the debate be confined to the bill." The power of controlling the country's food supply ought not to be lightly conferred; but, after the suggestions of Mr. Hoover had been put into the form of bills, and while the Committee on Agriculture was urging that they be taken up, the House, too busy for their immediate consideration, nevertheless found time to spend much of one day listening to a discussion of army rifles. It is obviously absurd that a large body of amateurs should expect to judge with what guns the American troops had best be supplied; but since the speaker was equipped with an interesting tableful of rifles the House let his speech run on for most of the day. "Which one can you reload the fastest?" asked Mr. Helm. "What is the range of that one?" Mr. Rowe wanted to know. "Do the shells land point first?" inquired Mr. Britten.

During the past week, however, the House has managed to stay closer to the business it has had in hand. Under the leadership of Mr. Lenroot and a few other members an increase of twenty-five per cent has been applied to the taxes originally levied upon incomes above $40,000. This movement has shown foresight, but it would be a mistake to assume that the House has generally accepted the principle of high income taxes as a war policy. Many members are not at present opposing increased rates because they stand with Mr. Longworth: "I want to raise enough money now by taxation to prevent the taxation question from being again thrown open in the near future. Then the lid will be off; it is on, now, to a certain extent."

Meantime, with the Espionage bill out of its way, the Senate has sent the three billion dollar Army and Navy Appropriation bill to conference and passed a number of minor war measures. No criticism can fairly be made of the extended debate which is being given to this latter measure; but of the minor bills passed, one has not had the attention it deserved. This measure—raising the enlisted strength of the Navy and Marine Corps to 150,000 men—originally required that the Senate confirm all minor officers temporarily appointed. But even a member so little inclined toward innovation as Mr. Mann declared that, "It is utterly ridiculous to require the names of lieutenants and captains to be sent to the Senate for confirmation"—and the House struck the provision from the bill. When the Senate got around to the measure, however, it quietly and with not a word of debate slipped the provision back in. One of the American traditions which will not perish in the war, without struggle, is "senatorial courtesy." C. M.

A COMMUNICATION

The Religion of Free Men

SIR: As conscientious objectors we turn to your journal because more powerfully than any other it has expressed in subtle analyses our abiding faith in humane wisdom. You have never countenanced the evil doctrine of the brute coercion of the human will. You have preached and practised the virtue of tolerance, the kind of tolerance for the lack of which the state grows mechanized and conscienceless.

You know something of the machinery of unfair play. You understand the tyranny of sham shibboleths. You appreciate the menace of military psychology. We appeal to you, strategically situated as you are, to assist the cause of the conscientious objectors. We beg you to note the following facts:

In the evolution of the human mind we discover a gradually widening hiatus between physical competence and intellectual moral competence. So deeply imbedded in our life values is this distinction that we feel rather ashamed of being too expert physically. The man of blood and iron does not appeal to our finer perceptions as a being altogether worthy of our worshipful attention. (The God whom we worship is neither a jingo nor a militarist.) But Voltaire—he of the skinny shanks and the anæmic face—what exuberant pride wells up in the greatest and in the least of us at the sound of that marvelous name! And soft-spoken Jesus—what fitting tribute can the reeling world lay at the feet of him who died that good will and loving kindness might assuage the hearts of inimical men.

The complexity and richness of life have permitted, and increasingly so, the more or less free play of *all modes* of energy. There are many men best adapted by training and temperament to the performance of physical acts of heroism; there are some men more naturally suited to the performance of intellectual deeds of courage, while yet some others shine in deeds of moral bravery. Why sanction the inhuman device of forcing all manner of men into the narrowly specific kind of devotion for which so many of them are hopelessly unfit? Tolerance arises from the existence of varying types of doers all willing to respect one another's special competence. It is not too extreme to assert that in war time (as in peace time) some of the most heroic deeds are performed by those who do not (and, if called upon, would not) take up arms in defense of the cause. There are other forms of bravery than the purely military one. Let us be reasonable.

The one ineradicable fact which no amount of official intimidation can pulverize out of existence is that there is a type of man to whom (military) participation in war is tantamount to committing murder. He cannot, he will not, commit murder. There is no human power on God's earth that can coerce him into committing (what *he* knows to be) the act of murder. You may call him sentimentalist, fool, slacker, mollycoddle, woman—anything "disreputable" you please. But there he is, a tremendous fact. Shall he be maltreated for his scruples? Or shall he be respected (as his deriders are) for his conscientiousness? We cannot leave so momentous an issue to chance or to the cold machinery of administration. Men of sensitive insight must help prepare a social setting within America sufficiently hospitable to all conscientious objectors.

It is good to remind ourselves of our instinctive respect

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for conscientious objectors. When a man is called to serve on a jury empaneled in a murder case he may be honorably excused from duty if he has conscientious objections to the death penalty. When we think sanely we are not averse to honoring the man of conscience provided he be an active friend of mankind and not a mere ease-taker. The test of manhood lies in service; *not* in one particular kind of service (suitable to one particular type of mind and body), but genuine service genuinely rendered to humanity.

Hence the philosophic value of tolerance. To keep alive genuine tolerance in war time is the greatest single achievement to which rationalists can dedicate themselves. America is caught in this insidious entanglement; obsessed with the tradition—the mere outward form and symbol—of liberty-of-conscience, she has failed to realize the living need of a real grant and a substantial practice of our vaunted freedom-of-conscience. It is not the tradition we lack; only a vital *belief* in that tradition.

In times of precarious peace, when the social classes wage an almost relentless warfare and the daily grind of poverty and distress lays armies of the proletariat low, life for the disadvantaged groups is made more or less livable only by the thought that between them and their official superiors certain constitutional and humane guarantees of tolerance exist as safeguards of mutual understanding. There is room for difference of opinion. There is a breathing space for discussion. How desperate must the social situation have become if large numbers of conscientious and law-abiding citizens have begun to feel an appalling sense of uneasiness in the presence of huge, inscrutable forces, far beyond their power of control or sympathetic understanding. Why this amazing disquietude? The answer is simple and straightforward. There is no longer the sense—so natural and dear to free men—of being able to appeal from manifestly unfair decisions. Too many subordinate officials are being vested with a tremendous authority over impotent human beings. The situation is complicated and made more sinister by the suspicion that many of the powerful gentlemen who in the days of ampler opportunity for social service and social justice failed most lamentably to respond to the public's needs are now the unchallenged controllers of the social destiny. What we must not overlook in this perilous situation is this disquieting fact: An excess of power permits certain anti-social men to wield with utter unscrupulousness the whole machinery of anti-humanism, of which by the sheer accident of circumstance they happen to be gaining possession at this critical time.

Then consider this: Sooner or later war must cease. The tremendous enterprise of recreating out of bloody chaos some new, reinspired internationalism will be the order of the day. Who is better fitted for that reconstructive task than those humanists now in imminent danger of being bullied out of existence because their visions and their faiths extend beyond the time of bloody chaos? It would be folly for a groping democracy to permit the degradation, the torture, and the slow annihilation of conscientious citizens. Whose duty shall it be to bring into permanent realization those humanist values (for which all men in their saner moods proudly contend) in behalf of which our war for democracy is said to be waged? If the reigning editorial intolerance, directed and sanctioned by official autocrats, is permitted to assassinate the greater promises held in trust by the workers for a world democracy, the outlook for a greater humanity is indeed mournful. Whom can we in this period of panic and pain rely upon? Humanitarians, workers in the social service, child welfare devotees, Tolstoians, radical educators—these constitute the vanguard of a revised and spiritually humanized world state. If civilization were to plan the utter wreckage of its most precious (because most consecrated) values, it could do no better than empower the mechanized state with the authority to brutalize and degrade all its visionaries.

Hasn't our evolving democracy and use for the student, the reflective man, the lonely thinker, the gentle philosopher, the socialist, the disciple of Jesus, the vision-haunted educator, the pity-racked lover of the human kind? Isn't sheer humanity itself a marvelous force for good? Is there no world recompense in having nurtured, honored, and immortalized Ralph Emerson, Henry Thoreau, Leo Tolstoi, Bertrand Russell, Norman Angell, and Romain Rolland? Is there no duty the conscientious thinker owes to the unborn world, the finer world of tomorrow, regenerated and recreated under the inspiration of the humanitarians? Can't we honestly respect the peculiar rights of those who have given their sincerest devotion to advocating the institution among men of that kind of livable régime by the very nature of which the present world calamity would have been rendered well-nigh unthinkable? Shall the dreamers of a true federation of mankind be sacrificed because they have not yet been permitted to realize their dream?

We desire to contribute our intellectual and moral energies to the creation of that humaner world in which conscience and tolerance and personality and philosophy will count as mightily as do their fierce negations now. We gladly accept the heartening summons pronounced in behalf of our democracy against an overweening autocracy by our own Woodrow Wilson:

> "But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government."

In bringing the gift of freedom to the distant unemancipated shall we betray so precious a cause by brute denial of freedom to those of our own blood and tradition, to our own freedom-lovers within the gate? What a sorry, tragical miscarriage of wisdom!

Our immediate problem is to persuade President Wilson to authorize the appointment to the Exemption Boards of men and women conspicuous for their social service. For example: Settlement workers, publicists, educators, social service devotees. We must not repeat the crime of our English cousins who, in a paroxysm of patriotism fell to the low level of sheer brute inhumanity. The members of the tribunals, as the distinguished Englishmen, Henry W. Nevinson, reports, "nearly all agreed in regarding conscience as an unpatriotic offense which must be visited by penalties!" Even Treitschke, the apostle of state domination, set it down as his belief that "the State is not the whole life of man or of society. It does not and should

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not touch his conscience or his religion. There is an inner life which is a man's own."

Shall we in America out-Treitschke Treitschke?

We have not been schooled by life to play the military rôle. We have never found it necessary or desirable to inflict our philosophies with a rod. We have been able and willing to instruct a recreant mankind by force of example, by the persuasions of wisdom, by the practice of fair play. We have found our existence tolerable precisely because we have known how to substitute for the rigors of coercion the rigors of persuasion. We have no military competence. We possess only intellectual and moral competence. We would serve gladly, generously, high-heartedly—but we cannot serve except it be honestly, conscientiously, morally.

We ask you to bear in mind the inspiring assurance vouched for to a listening world on the eve of our great championship of universal democracy. President Woodrow Wilson asserted as of fundamental importance to the creation and survival of democracy "the privilege of men everywhere *to choose their way of life and of obedience.*" Everywhere, gentlemen!

Conscientious Objectors and Their Champions,

NORMAN THOMAS,
HENRY R. LINVILLE,
GABRIEL R. MASON,
FRANKLIN J. KELLER,
SAMUEL SCHMALHAUSEN,
GARIBALDI M. LAPOLLA,
M. BARASCH,
THOMAS MUFSON,
CHARLES HAM,
HARRISON C. THOMAS,
BERNARD M. PARELHOFF,
CHARLES RAUBICHECK,
A. HENRY SCHNEER.

CORRESPONDENCE

The Press and Free Speech

SIR: To an unprejudiced observer the tremendous protest of the press of the country against the proposed censorship of news seems somewhat inconsistent with the attitude of most of that same press toward the right of free speech of individuals. In headlines and editorials demand is made for an unrestricted right to print all news, criticism, etc., which does not constitute a direct betrayal of the military plans of our country to the enemy. The preservation of such a right is, of course, an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of democratic ideals of true liberty. The case of the press would, however, have a much better status if it fought with equal vehemence for the right of "free speech" and condemned, instead of approving of, the action of those hysterically patriotic and short-sighted judges and intolerant citizens who refuse to their fellow-men the right of expressing views on the ways and means of securing a speedy peace without victory and an end to the "competitive annihilation" so graphically described in your last week's issue.

The fact that their views do not coincide with the thoughts of the "stand-while-Dixie-is being-played" patriots is no reason for the condemnation of these intelligently patriotic men, whose aim is the salvation of mankind. Certainly, enough democratic principles are suspended and in danger of destruction in these parlous times without the further sacrifice of a constitutional right, "Free Speech," so essential to the perpetuation of what America should mean. Let us not fight for the democratization of Germany at the expense of American Democracy. Rather let us, who have deemed ourselves the custodians of the torch of liberty, have the benefits of its effulgent beams, the while we endeavor to clear away the murky mists which hinder them from shining upon the world as a whole. Let us fight and make sacrifice if we must, but let our aims and our ideals remain unmixed; only so can we serve America and mankind.

TOM MEANEY, JR.

Jersey City, New Jersey.

National Congressmen

SIR: For the last month or so I have been thinking of a scheme that will add to Congress certain members who will be responsible, not to any particular section of the country, but to the nation as a whole.

You have said in a number of leading editorials that to the desire for pork and the absorption of members in petty party politics are to be attributed the indifference of these members of the lower house, especially to the larger issues. You have designated the majority of the members of the House of Representatives as attorneys for local plunder and you say in your editorial on Pulling Congress Together:

"What Congress needs is organized leadership which is responsible not to districts or states but to the nation" and "which will pull each of the two houses together for constructive legislation."

In other words, you say that Congress needs nationally minded men, men that are responsible to neither districts nor states. It is such men that my plan might be able to give the nation, not at this moment, to be sure, but eventually.

My suggestion is that every four years, at the time of the Presidential election, the voters of the nation cast their ballots for a specified number of Congressmen to be elected by the whole nation but not on party lines. These members may be known as Representatives-at-large and are not to trouble themselves with the ordering of garden seed for constituents nor bother about architectural pork. Of course, it is not essential that they be elected with the President, but if they are chosen with him, the mind of the people will unconsciously associate these men with the solution of national problems. They will be expected to be nationally minded men. At least, they must be men known throughout the country. The great trouble lies in that, no matter how acceptable the scheme, a constitutional amendment is necessary to carry it into effect.

H. P. S.

New York City.

A Difference in Incomes

SIR: In England, where they have been imposing heavy taxes on income, they have made a distinction, I believe, between earned and unearned. A man's current salary for instance is classed as earned income. A man's return on his investments is classed as unearned. The tax on the latter kind of income is higher than it is on the former. Of course, both should be high in war time, but it seems fair to tax the "unearned" kind highest.

CLARENCE DAY, JR.

New York City.

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Books and Things

THERE is a new Stalky story, called Regulus, in Mr. Kipling's new volume, A Diversity of Creatures. It appeared a few months ago in the Metropolitan, some of whose readers, not having studied Latin more than seven or eight years, may have thought so much Horace almost too much. No matter. Horace gives Mr. Kipling a chance to make amends to King, most detestable of the housemasters in Stalky & Co. In the earlier Stalky stories King was a very awful person. He was loud, argumentative, fond of repeating to the other masters "every word of his brilliant repartees" to "some unlucky child of thirteen." In Regulus, though King is still hopelessly facetious, he has made some progress toward a decent life. He hates words like spouse, forsooth, eventually transpire. His passion for Horace is real and plain to be seen. "Those lines . . . ought to be written in blood. Yet there are things in human garments which will tell you that Horace was a flâneur—a man about town. Avoid such beings." This is an improved King. It is well, however, that the improvement in King has not gone so far as to endear him to his creator, for Mr. Kipling has not often been at his happiest in drawing "sympathetic" schoolmasters. Take, for example, the Head of the school, Bates, whom the boys admire with an admiration that endures. Mr. Kipling feels toward Bates as they do, and as most readers, I imagine, do not. He overestimates Bates. The story called A Little Prep., in Stalky & Co., is a masterpiece in the art of presenting a deed of heroism so that the reader slightly dislikes the hero.

Nothing, as the aestheticians have told us many times, and as we have often found out for ourselves, disturbs readers of fiction more than the discovery that their value-judgments and the author's value-judgments are quite unlike. Consider such humble values as are involved in the appreciation of a joke. There are several tales of elaborate practical jokes in A Diversity of Creatures—The Honours of War, for instance, and The Horse Marines, and The Village that Voted the Earth was Flat. I can easily conceive that it would have been fun to have a hand in any of these. The pleasures of action are so keen that they often blind the practical joker to whatever there may be of monstrous disproportion in the elaborateness of his preparations. But as jokes to read about all three are terribly elaborate, though no two in the same degree. They do not seem so funny as Mr. Kipling thinks them, and one of his methods of persuading us that they are funny serves only to call attention to the difference between his estimate of them and ours. He crowds his stage with persons in whom these jokes wake laughter that is prolonged and exhausting. How would you feel, when looking at a real stage, if the actors were detained and fascinated and compelled to endless guffaws by jokes which you were ready to smile at once or twice and then to leave behind? You would be annoyed. The annoyance is not so deadly in a story as it would be at a play, but even in a story it can do a lot of execution.

Let me violate your modesty by calling attention to an engaging trait in your character. Although a good sailor you do not inevitably and forever laugh at signs of seasickness in your fellow-creatures. You might still be able to laugh at seasickness in life if seasickness in literature had not dulled your appetite for this variety of the comic. Mr. Kipling's appetite is more robust. He still enjoys the seasickness joke. Nausea caused by nicotine poisoning delights him. See, in Stalky & Co., the effort of one long Indian cheroot upon its three smokers, Stalky, McTurk and Beetle. See a story called My Sunday at Home in The Day's Work, for his pleasure in nausea due to another cause. Is it a general truth, or isn't it, that a writer who laughs inextinguishably at seasickness will also laugh inextinguishably at bad smells? Off hand I cannot say which is funnier to Mr. Kipling. An Unsavory Interlude, the story which tells how Stalky & Co. put a dead cat between the floor and the ceiling of King's dormitory, almost convinces me that the bad smell joke is dearer to Mr. Kipling than the seasickness joke. But I am not sure. Nor am I prepared to assert that Mr. Kipling is more charmed by the effects of bad smells than Mr. Arnold Bennett. Did you ever read Mr. Bennett's tale of the adventures of the high cheese that took a railway journey? For several weeks after that story I could not read Mr. Bennett fearlessly.

Seldom can a writer gain his end by laughing more immoderately, or by peopling his story with characters who laugh more immoderately, than he can reasonably expect us to laugh. He must find, if he cannot let the oldest jokes in the world alone, a different method of celebrating them. Boswell, in whom, so they say, all things are to be found, suggests a possible method. Mr. Chambers mentioned one evening, when Johnson and Boswell were calling on him in the Temple, that he had that day drawn a will for one of their friends, who had devised his estate to his three sisters. And Boswell goes on:

> I have known him [Johnson] at times exceedingly diverted at what seemed to others a very small sport. He now laughed immoderately, without any reason that we could perceive, at our friend's making his will; called him the *testator,* and added, "I dare say, he thinks he has done a mighty thing. He won't stay till he gets home to his seat in the country, to produce this wonderful deed: he'll call up the landlord of the first inn on the road; and, after a suitable preface upon mortality and the uncertainty of life, will tell him that he should not delay making his will; and here, Sir, will he say, is my will, which I have just made, with the assistance of one of the ablest lawyers in the Kingdom; and he will read it to him" (laughing all the time). . . . Mr. Chambers did not by any means relish this jocularity upon a matter of which *pars magna fuit,* and seemed impatient till he got rid of us. Johnson could not stop his merriment, but continued it all the way till we got without the Temple-gate. He then burst into such a fit of laughter, that he appeared to be almost in a convulsion; and, in order to support himself, laid hold of one of the posts at the side of the foot pavement, and sent forth peals so loud, that in the silence of the night his voice seemed to resound from Temple-bar to Fleet-ditch.

Boswell is amused by Johnson's amusement, not by the thing which amused Johnson. All his technique needs, in order to make it perfect for authors who still think seasickness irresistible, is a little adaptation. Let them pretend to be less amused by seasickness itself than they really are. Let them pretend to be curiously observant of those who can still laugh at it. Insincere? Of course. Isn't insincerity a part of technique? Wouldn't even Mr. Kipling be willing to hide his own pleasure for the sake of giving his readers less pain? P. L.

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The Cost of Peace

An Inquiry Into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation, by Thorstein Veblen. New York: The Macmillan Co. $2.00.

COMPARATIVELY few people know the work of Thorstein Veblen. Some thousands have read his best-known book, the brilliant, drastic Theory of the Leisure Class; but only a few hundred have read his Theory of Business Enterprise, his Instinct of Workmanship and his Imperial Germany. So little is he known that a pretentious man the other day met my mention of The Nature of Peace by saying, "Ah, of course, a new translation." He did not know that Thorstein Veblen was an American, was graduated from an American university, in the 'eighties, and has been teaching in American universities ever since. Mr. Veblen is an American writer but the kind of American writer whose merit is rather more clearly recognized abroad than at home, an American who ought to have been a foreigner to be appreciated in America.

To read Mr. Veblen is not and cannot be an entertainment. There is a kind of fashionable lady who knows precisely when a literary Paquin has ceased to be the thing, and who twitters as unfailingly as any bird at the first breath of another master's dawn. For all this turn for novelty, few ladies have twittered much or are ever going to twitter much about Mr. Veblen's performance. He is too difficult to understand. It is hard intellectual labor to read any of his books, and to skim him is impossible. He is not a luxurious valley of easy reading, a philosophic Tennyson. He is a mountain—stubborn, forbidding, purgatorial. There is no funicular to bring him under subjection of the indolent, and sometimes there is barely a foothold even for the hardy amid the tortuosities of his style. But the reward for those who do persist in reading him is commensurate with the effort. No mountain pierces to heaven, not even Mr. Veblen's, but the area that he unrolls is strategically chosen and significantly inclusive. Part of the reward of reading him may be like the reward of mountain-climbing itself, the value of tough exercise for its own sake, but unless Mr. Veblen created the conviction that his large purposes did reasonably necessitate intricate and laborious processes of thought and that such processes had to be followed in detail in order that his argument might be mastered, no one would be quite satisfied to take the pains he exacts. The greatest justification of such pains is the final sense conveyed by him that he has had a singular contribution to make, and has made it with complete regard to the formidable requirements of responsible unconventional utterance.

The responsible unconventionality of Mr. Veblen has never been better exemplified than in this new book of his, finished February, 1917, on the nature of peace. It is, so far as I know, the most momentous work in English on the encompassment of lasting peace. There are many books that aim to give geographic domicile to the kind of tinkered peace that is likely to come out of this war, but I know of no book that gives so plain and positive account of the terms "on which peace at large may be hopefully installed and maintained," and I know of no discussion so searching as to "what if anything there is in the present situation that visibly makes for a realization of these necessary terms within a calculable future." Those who are acquainted with Mr. Veblen's work are aware of the ironic inscrutability of his manner, the detachment that is at once an evidence of his impartiality and an intimation of his corrosive scepticism. It can no longer be said, with The Nature of Peace under examination, that either impartiality or scepticism induces Mr. Veblen to withhold his preference, to conceal his bias, in the present contingency. That bias, however, does not lead him into any of the current patriotic extravagances. If critical acid can corrode the patriotic conceptions of "democracy" and "liberty" that are now so familiar, Mr. Veblen makes no attempt to keep such fancies from being eaten into. What is left, however, is sufficiently substantial to give him the issue that abides in the war, and its bearing on peace, and it provides him with his clue to the great eventuality, "the consequences presumably due to follow."

It would be wrong in any review of Mr. Veblen to give a mere bald outline of the work that is so full of his manifold mind. There are so many "patent imbecilities" (like the protective tariff), so many current egregious practices (like business men's sabotage), that receive characteristic illumination in transit, the bare colorless statement of his conclusions would completely leave out the poignancy that accumulates as he proceeds. His conclusions are, on the other hand, impressive enough to indicate the importance of the argument back of them, and if only for their suggestion of the massive argument they need to be reported. Defeat for the German-Imperial coalition, not victory for the Entente belligerents, is the first step toward lasting peace that he recognizes, because of the decisive difference "between those people whose patriotic affections center about the fortunes of an impersonal commonwealth and those in whom is superadded a fervent aspiration for dynastic ascendancy." Peace on terms of Germany's unconditional surrender is not discussed by Mr. Veblen on

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the basis of likelihood but on the basis of its desirability in relation to the chances for peace, and the unlikelihood of lasting peace in its absence. But this is not the ordinary orgiastic contemplation of an enemy destroyed. The elements in Germany that conspire against lasting peace are carefully computed, and the terms of their disintegration discussed in every detail. It is by no means forgotten that if the victorious side is not "shorn over the comb of neutralization and democracy" there can in any event be no prospect of perpetuating peace.

The present unfitness of Germany (or Japan) for lasting peace is ascribed by Mr. Veblen to the essential dynastic need for warlike enterprise, but he has no hesitation whatever in declaring in regard to the Allied Powers that peace in general demands the "relinquishment of all those undemocratic institutional survivals out of which international grievances are wont to arise." This is not the customary emphasis of goodwill-pacifists. They are fain to propose peace on the present basis of "national jealousies and discriminations" and what Mr. Veblen in his highly personal jargon calls "discrepancies." Mr. Veblen alludes to the League to Enforce Peace as a movement for the "collusive safeguarding of national discrepancies by force of arms." This toleration of existing nationalisms Mr. Veblen plainly regards as an insuperable obstacle to peace. He exposes in every detail the predisposition to war that inheres in nationalisms. "What the peace-makers might logically be expected to concern themselves about would be the elimination of these discrepancies that make for embroilment."

The military defeat of Germany seems to the author a requisite step on the direct path to peace. This is only because Germany is dynastic, however, and the German people subservient to the dynasty. One of the issues most thoroughly debated by Mr. Veblen is the pregnant issue of German democratization, and while he lays great stress on the necessity for military defeat as a first requirement of democratization he does not believe the disintegrating of Germany's dynastic "second nature" is of so hopeless a character as its historic persistence might imply. There is no complacency in the attitude that leads him to regard imperial Germany (or imperial Japan) as a stumbling-block in the road to lasting pace. It is an attitude founded on a strict and even solicitous estimate of the patent German and Japanese aims. And in so far as a peace policy involves treatment of the German people Mr. Veblen is quite certain that no trade discrimination against them, necessarily bound to recoil on the common people, would be pacifically effective or justifiable. The persecution of the German common people could take no form that would conceivably advance the cause of peace, and Mr. Veblen is careful to dissociate his belief that Germany should be beaten from the belief that the people of Germany should be made to suffer for their differentiation after the war.

Where The Nature of Peace seems to me to rise far and away above the current discussions of supernationalism is in its comparative freedom from unanalyzed conceptions. There is nothing sacred to Mr. Veblen in the conception of patriotism, of property, of success, of manliness, of good breeding, of national honor, of prestige. The notion of non-resistance has no terrors for him—he writes a chapter on its merits. But so dry is he that it is only one reading him attentively who will gather his extraordinarily subversive character, his invincible mind. The blessedness of this unsparing intelligence is so great that one has a constant acute pleasure in pursuing Mr. Veblen's argument. If one had long perceived for oneself, for example, that "business" means waste and inefficiency, it is pleasant to have Mr. Veblen introduce the same perceptions, but when he proceeds to locate them in his spacious understanding of the whole international problem, and to reveal their unquestionable bearing on the alternatives of war and peace, one has a happy consciousness of coming honestly to a wider and deeper view of realities. This is the supreme gift of Mr. Veblen's disinterested inquiry.

The notion that a lasting peace is compatible with the established patriotic order of things, with the status of the gentleman in England or the business man in the United States, is not entertained for one moment by Mr. Veblen, and regardless of the "maggoty conceit of national domination" which demands "the virtual erasure of the Imperial dynasty," he sees an impediment to peace in the dear establishments of "upperclass and pecuniary control" in the allied commonwealths. Chief and foremost in the pacific arrangement must come "a considerable degree of neutralization, extending to virtually all national interests and pretensions, but more particularly to all material and commercial interests of the federated peoples; and, indispensably and especially, such neutralization would have to extend to the nations from whom aggression is now apprehended, as, e.g., the German people." All manner of trade discrimination has to be abolished—"import, export and excise tariff, harbor and registry dues, subsidy, patent right, copyright, trade mark, tax exemption whether partial or exclusive, investment preferences at home and abroad." Besides this prescription for "the elimination of discrepancies that make for embroilment," a neutralization of citizenship is also indicated, the common man standing to lose nothing by these revisions. But Mr. Veblen is frank to say that "this prospect of consequences" points to a general revolution. "It has appeared in the course of the argument that the preservation of the present pecuniary law and order, with all its incidents of ownership and investment, is incompatible with an unwarlike state of peace and security. This current scheme of investment, business, and sabotage, should have an appreciably better chance of survival in the long run if the present conditions of warlike preparation and national insecurity were maintained, or if the projected peace were left in a somewhat problematical state, sufficiently precarious to keep national animosities alert, and thereby to the neglect of domestic interests, particularly of such interests as touch the popular well-being. On the other hand, it has also appeared that the cause of peace and its perpetuation might be materially advanced if precautions were taken beforehand to put out of the way as much as may be of those discrepancies of interest and sentiment between nations and between classes which make for dissension and eventual hostilities."

The weight of these phrases it is not easy to catch in passing, but nothing more significant has been written since the outbreak of the war. One has only to go back to The Theory of Business Enterprise, published in 1903, to learn how Mr. Veblen foresaw this war, and America's participation in it. The same rigor of intellectual standard that gave him a command of the situation at that time is discernible in this present volume, and gives him dominance now. Such severity of mind as Mr. Veblen exhibits is not likely to win him many readers, despite its Brahms-like quality, but the recommendation of Mr. Veblen is not merely the recommendation of a great philosopher of industrialism. It is not his relentless logic alone that elevates him. It is the democratic bias which The Nature of Peace indicates.

F. H.

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Treitschke's History

A History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, by H. von Treitschke. Second volume. New York: McBride Nast Co. $3.75.

THE translation of Treitschke's great work proceeds leisurely on its way. The translators are not Fitzgerald to his Omar, but they are not able, even despite some distressing inelegancies, to mar the obvious brilliance of the whole. The second volume is particularly important. It paints the picture of the disorganized Germany which awaited the unifying efforts of the half-century from Waterloo. It contains the almost feverishly brilliant picture of Germanic civilization at the opening of the nineteenth century. It is a volume written from a full heart, even if at times the blood seems to have turned to gall. For it is the description of exactly that Germany Treitschke so bitterly despised—a Germany of separate principalities and diverse cultures, the Germany of Niebuhr and Ranke, of Boeckh and Ottfried Muller, rather than the Prussianized Germany of Droysen and Von Sybel. To read its writings alongside the writings of the last thirty years is like studying the difference between an orchestra and a brass band. To those who write in the troubled dissonances of a great war it is not difficult to feel a deep affection for the early Germany Treitschke describes so well. It was generous in purpose and rich in achievement. Scientific history and scientific theology were in a real sense its creation, and they had not been prostituted to the service of a bastard nationalism. They were tolerably free from political preoccupation; and it is to-day worth while emphasizing that von Ranke is still the most generously cosmopolitan of historians. They who loved Germany so well that it seemed then the smallest service to devote a lifetime to her scholarship did not dream they were creating the materials of a malignant polemic. Hate seems the last word to use of men like Neander or Lachmann. The new spirit that has been born is surely in basis alien to that of the scholars themselves. Von Sybel, after all, wrote nothing that was not a pamphlet. Droysen, if he attempted anything, attempted a romantic commentary on Prussian history. Treitschke was a soldier whom deafness condemned to the pen. Historians, in the sense that Mommsen, the editor of the Corpus Inscriptionum, was a historian, or Ritschl, they would never have professed to be. What seems to have happened was a discovery on the part of German statesmen that the opinion of the world holds scholarship in high respect. They imagined that men would accept their causes if they were introduced by names great in the field of learning. But they forgot that the maxim "experto crede" limits the expert to his province. And they brought the whole subject of history into a lamentable disrepute.

It was inevitable that the war should bring the name of Treitschke into an ugly prominence. But it is important to remember that the ill fame he has acquired comes less from the History than from the Politics; though the ignorant narrowness of the latter deserves whatever condemnation it may obtain. The History is on a different plane. It is brilliant, it is eloquent, and even if it is not seldom inaccurate, it represents great erudition. That from which it seems to have inspired distrust is the fact that it was written to prove a theory. Treitschke believed passionately in the empire, and he burned to show that it was the logical consequence of German history. His was not the

AUTHORS AND THE FOOD SUPPLY

Publishers' mail is always interesting because each letter may announce the ideal manuscript. But the Yale University Press mail is now awaited even more eagerly because it also brings news of the war activities of its authors. It is particularly gratifying to see how often they have been called by the Government to put into practice the good counsel of their books. Several authors, for instance, have been appointed to the Food and Supply Committees of the National Research Council.

The problem of how to furnish a family with nourishing food at a minimum cost has already been met by Dr. Graham Lusk in his "Fundamental Basis of Nutrition," [1] and many families will adopt the rations which he recommends there as the solution of the food famine.

Professor Chittenden's investigations are peculiarly interesting at this time because the diet of the German people during the war has been the low protein diet that he long recommended contrary to the opinion of German chemists before the war. (His volume of "Studies in Physiological Chemistry" [2] appeared in the Yale Bicentennial Series.) He is now considered a prophet in Germany.

Dr. Lafayette B. Mendel has already made a study of the foods supplied us from cold storage and by importation and the part they should play in our diet, in "Changes in the Food Supply and Their Relation to Nutrition." [3]

In "Wild Life Conservation in Theory and Practice," [4] William T. Hornaday writes: "The preservation of wild life affects the lumber-pile, the market-basket, and the dinner-pail." His plea for the birds that preserve our crops by killing the insects that destroy them will certainly be heard in this year when lumber for ships and provender for dinner-pails are to determine future history. Among his other patriotic services Mr. Hornaday is acting as President of the U. S. Junior Naval Reserve, Vice-President of the Army League of the U. S., on the Advisory Board of the American Legion, and on the National Committee of the American Defense Society.

Mr. Johnston, a Civil War veteran, is conducting what he describes as a "tuber munition plant." Those who have read his delightful biography of Nathan Hale [5] will be interested to know that his potato farm is located in Hadlyme, Conn.

Another phase of the work of supplies has been undertaken by Edward D. Page. He is acting as advisor to the Quartermaster Department, classifying prospective sellers, arranging to finance operations, organizing transportation, and in general assisting in the equipment of the new army of a million men. He writes: "Profiteering is so unpopular as to be almost immoral, which confirms my ideal of the ethical sentiment amongst the leaders of business life." The great compensation of the war grow out of just the quickened sense of ethics which is the subject of Mr. Page's interesting chapters on "Trade Morals: Their Origin, Growth and Province." [6]

Such authors, who by their books and works are offering expert service to the nation recall the meaning of the words of Richard de Bury: "In books warlike affairs are methodized; the rights of peace proceed from books."

[1] THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF NUTRITION. By Graham Lusk. (Fourth Printing.) 50 cents net.

[2] STUDIES IN PHYSIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY. Edited by Russell H. Chittenden. $4.00 net.

[3] CHANGES IN THE FOOD SUPPLY AND THEIR RELATION TO NUTRITION. By Lafayette B. Mendel. 50 cents net.

[4] WILD LIFE CONSERVATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By William T. Hornaday. 14 illustrations. $1.50 net.

[5] NATHAN HALE, 1776, BIOGRAPHY AND MEMORIALS. By Henry Phelps Johnston. (Revised Edition.) 4 illustrations. $2.35 net.

[6] TRADE MORALS: THEIR ORIGIN, GROWTH AND PROVINCE. By Edward D. Page. $1.50 net.

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temperament to be satisfied with sober narrative or patient analysis. A great orator, he yearned for a cause to defend, and the History gave him a magnificent opportunity. He made full use of it. The History is a household word in Germany, as Macaulay in England or Taine in France. And it is that deservedly. With all its faults, it is a fundamental book. Much effort will be spent in the archives of twenty states before it is equalled. A genius akin to Treitschke's own will be required to surpass it.

Why, then, should it be deemed historically fashionable to condemn what he wrote? We live in an age of science, and its cold objectivity is the eager desire of every scholar. But just as in physics nowadays, every worker goes about with his private ether in his pocket, so it is permissible in historical work to differ on the fundamental questions. If Treitschke was partisan, it is worth remembering that Macaulay wrote a great book to beatify the whigs, that Grote made of Greek history a paean to democracy, and Bancroft of American a hymn to a beneficent Providence. Stubbs, it is true, was able on the basis of Tory convictions to write a history which reads like a study in progressive radicalism, and no one could extract a political theory from the collected works of von Ranke. But impartial historians are the exception. It is surely impossible for any mind to make an intensive study of human activity in some given period without forming hypotheses to explain or adducing arguments to convince. It may well be doubted, indeed, whether we want our historians to write, like Lamartine, for the purpose of making immediate history. Natura nihil facit per saltum is as admirable in the business of government as otherwise. But the great business of history reduces itself, in the last analysis, to the study of men, and the study of men is, in the end, the study of moral problems. No one can write a history of American institutions without taking account of the antagonistic temperaments of Hamilton and Jefferson. No one can explain the constitutional experiments of the Commonwealth without at the same time analyzing the practical mysticism of Cromwell. The English Constitution is different because Mr. Gladstone lived to be eighty-nine, and the American Constitution will be different because Mr. Wilson has a love of solitude. Dislike it how we will, this world has been made by the temperaments of men, and we are bound, in the nature of things, to make our judgments of their effort. It is easy to talk of relativity; but the fact of the matter is that we do not talk relatively where we care deeply. We cannot talk without profound feeling on the present war; but it is easy to make a dispassionate survey of the war of the Austrian succession. Impartiality is either a matter of time, or else it is a result of cold-bloodedness. It is, of course, possible to talk of compromise and conciliation; but where there are fundamental principles at stake, truth, as we see it, must come first and without sacrifice.

That was the attitude of Treitschke. His whole soul was passionately convinced that the German Empire represented the pivotal achievement of German history. He hated the chaos of separatism, and he disliked the looseness of the early confederation. He did not believe in democracy, and the army represented to him the basis of national survival. It is very certain that if von Ranke had written his history it would have been a great book; but it is also certain that we should have less fully understood the implications of the cause for which Stein and Bismarck labored than we do to-day. What, of course, we lamentably need is a historian who should point the lesson of Gierke's Genossenschaftsrecht for the history of Germany in the nineteenth century. That would be a powerful antidote to Treitschke's work, and it would have political results of importance. After all, the idea of impartial scholarship will always have its exponents, just as there will always be men willing to write history as romance. But a man who has a great cause to maintain has surely the right to use the weapons of which he feels himself the master in order to secure its advancement.

It may be urged that he must not sacrifice, as often enough Treitschke seems to have sacrified, truth to his convictions. To that there are at least two observations necessary. It is permissible to doubt whether Treitschke consciously perverted the truth. It is probably undeniable that desire often guided his vision, but that is an experience to which most of us are at some time subject. And when the historian deliberately falsifies for his purpose, sooner or later the error will be purged from the general body of knowledge. In his first year of editorial work Mommsen rejected over one thousand inscriptions from Naples previously accepted as genuine. No one now believes in Hume's estimate of Cromwell as a great bad man. Mr. Graham Wallas has stripped Lord Grey of his Elijah's mantle and altered the whole perspective of the Reform movement in England by his discovery of Francis Place. A famous Napoleonic forgery has been traced to the emperor himself. What we must ask from the historian ought surely to be that he write down what he believes to be the result of his observations as he sees them. The rest may well be left to time. And in the case of Treitschke's interpretation it is very clear how the passage of events supplies a new content to their meaning Bismarck is no longer a good angel even to the sabred veterans of the Wilhelmstrasse. Carlyle's Frederick has not escaped unscathed from his reckless love of applied epigrams. The sooner we recognize that history is the reflection of the historian's temperament the better it will be for our understanding of its purpose. The richer, surely, will then be the lessons it can teach us.

H. J. L.

Recent Publications

Six Major Prophets, by Edwin S. Slosson. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. $1.50.

IN a previous volume Mr. Slosson did an extremely useful bit of exposition of the doctrine and influence of six major prophets of ante-bellum Continental fame—Ostwald, Bergson and Maeterlinck among them. Except for the name of one German, Rudolf Eucken, the prophets in this volume are all Anglo-Saxon. One American, John Dewey, is included, a prophet who until quite recently was unknown except among his own disciples. The other four are Shaw, Wells, Chesterton and F. C. S. Schiller, the English pragmatist or humanist, as he likes to call himself, whose almost gaily difficult philosophical position is cogently and clearly explained in Mr. Slosson's brief essay. The book performs a welcome service. There are authentic and complete bibliographies appended to each essay; even the photographs give one some approximation to a human likeness instead of the conventional caricature which so often passes for a "literary" picture. Mr. Slosson attempts only the degree of criticism necessary for full depiction. His object is to furnish the reader with the materials for making his own judgment rather than to supply him with patented criteria. This is a modesty

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which disguises no weakness of conviction but the desire to achieve an end. Mr. Slosson has met most of his prophets in the flesh, and could have sketched a half-dozen industrious personal impressions in the space he allows to each essay had he chosen to exploit his mere random opinions. He chose, however, to give only the amount of biographical detail necessary for a background. Even the quotations are not introduced with any pretentious sham of their being so wisely selected that they give the whole substance of the man's philosophy. Their function is not so much explication as stimulation. Probably the essay on Eucken would have been different in tone had it been written to-day. Mr. Slosson has preferred to let it stand as he originally wrote it for the Independent, a sort of ante-bellum view of German philosophy. If the present book is sometimes less pungent in style than Mr. Slosson's earlier expositions, he has still accomplished his purpose. He can be informative without even skirting dulness.

The Japanese Invasion, by Jesse Frederick Steiner, Ph.D. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. $1.25.

MR. STEINER attempts a statement rather than a solution of the interracial contacts between Americans and Japanese. By "invasion," of course, he means merely what European diplomats euphemistically call "economic penetration." For, after all, the American prejudice against the Japanese—or vice versa—appears a by-product of larger economic factors after reading this analysis. Since the triumph of machinery the entire world has found that the mobility of populations has given the whole problem of emigration a new status. As long as the standard of living in Japan is low enough to create discontent among the Japanese themselves at home, Japanese foreign policy will have as its chief aim the opening of roads to emigrants. America is still the promised land to the Japanese disinherited, and although Americans may despise the emigrants from the East because of their color, it does not alter the basic Japanese necessity and desire for enlarged opportunity. A severe immigration policy and a formidable military power will probably work during the storm and stress period when Japan and China are finding themselves, economically and industrially. Mr. Steiner does not believe this so happy a solution as the solution through coöperation—only possible after an unflinching survey of the facts. The purpose of this book is competently fulfilled in supplying us with those facts.

Contributors

to this issue

WILLIAM HARD is a graduate of Northwestern University, Illinois, and has also studied in England. He has contributed articles on economics and politics to several magazines and is now on the staff of the Metropolitan Magazine. He is the author of The Women of Tomorrow.

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